Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico

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ABSTRACT

Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

Vicente Fox's triumph over the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico's July 2000 presidential election surprised many observers—academics, journalists, and politicians alike. The PRI's 71 years of control over Mexican politics rested on its unusual capacity to mobilize votes, albeit not always by legally recognized methods. The PRI's demise had long been predicted, but the ruling party continued to pull out victories well into the 1990s, leading most analysts to expect that the PRI would find a way to win again in July 2000. At the same time, the PRI's longevity also reflected the weaknesses of Mexican opposition parties. Their principal debilities included the limited social bases of the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and campaign strategies seemingly not intended to reach beyond those social bases.

Yet the PAN's Fox won convincingly over his main rivals, the PRI's Francisco Labastida and the PRD's Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (running in his third presidential race). Fox's victory reflected the emergence over the previous decade-and-a-half of a profound new cleavage in Mexican politics, centered not on socioeconomic differences and social issues but on the issue of the one-party regime's future. Fox and his team devised a strategy to capitalize on this proregime-antiregime cleavage, but his stunning success is only the most prominent example of changes in Mexico's

parties that add up to the emergence of a new party system. The dynamics of this new party system put less emphasis on the ideological or programmatic characteristics of contending parties than on the capacity of those in opposition—whether at the national, state, or local level—to frame an election in anti- and progovernment terms. President Fox and his party learned this lesson in stark terms when the PAN lost more than 50 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2003 midterm elections.

Mexico's parties have developed distinctive social bases over years of contesting elections, as this article will demonstrate. For the former opposition parties, those social bases reflected the policies advocated in party platforms. Those social bases, however, have not formed the main basis for Mexican voter choice. Indeed, Fox would never have won if he had relied only on the PAN's past voter base. Moreover, although economic conditions may have shaped Mexican voting decisions in past elections (Poiré 1999; Magaloni 1999; Buendía 2000), they hardly laid the basis for Fox's upset win in 2000. The Mexican economy was experiencing robust growth in 2000, and President Ernesto Zedillo enjoyed high approval ratings, hardly grounds for voting out Zedillo's handgroomed successor.

Instead, the regime issue increasingly focused the decisions of Mexican voters in the 1990s. One manifestation of the electorate's new orientation was the emergence of regional strengths for the opposition parties. Regionalism in party voting emerged from opposition strategies designed to build party strength by winning at the local level. This, in turn, required that the parties emphasize a "throw the bums out" message, which reinforced the proregime-antiregime cleavage in the electorate. A second manifestation of this division, clear in the 1997 congressional elections and the 2000 presidential contest and continuing into the 2003 congressional elections, has been vote switching, especially among independents and oppositionists, many of whom cared less whether they voted for the PRD or the PAN than that they voted against the PRI, at least until the PRI was voted out of the presidency. Fox benefited greatly from vote switching, but his party's candidates have also suffered as voters have switched back to the PRI or the PRD in elections since July 2000.

In short, economic voting cannot explain Vicente Fox's victory, nor can social class or other social cleavages account for the swing of voters in 2000. Instead, to understand fully the Fox win, we must consider a combination of forces. Central to the analysis here is partisan dealignment, a process at work for the past 15 or more years. With more independent and weakly attached voters in the electorate in the 1990s, the parties (including the PRI) were forced to adapt their campaign strategies to capture the floating voters now available to the opposition. As a result, the parties have come to resemble catch-all parties to a much

greater degree than they did before, although struggles persist within the parties between those who advocate ideological consistency and coherence and those who would adopt whatever tactics and messages will bring victory.

As they increasingly pursued catch-all strategies to win victory, the opposition parties chose to exploit, or even exaggerate, the proregime-antiregime cleavage that emerged in the Mexican electorate in the late 1980s. Those strategies succeeded first in local and state-level contests in the 1990s, and Fox used them most effectively in his presidential campaign. Since the 2000 watershed, the proregime-antiregime cleavage has lost most of its meaning, but the relative detachment of voters remains, permitting all parties to use catch-all strategies to capture the votes needed to throw whoever is in government out. The consequence has been not only a change of regime but also the emergence of a new party system.

To explain the bases of Fox's victory and to show how the new Mexican party system has emerged, this study first traces the development of competition in Mexican electoral politics since the mid-1980s. This analysis illustrates how the hegemonic party system collapsed in the 1990s, to be replaced not by a three-party system but by two separate two-party systems.

An examination of the social and regional bases of the parties suggests that the two (former) opposition parties have distinct social bases, which condition some of their ideological or programmatic orientations. These parties' regional strengths suggest, however, that the PAN and the PRD concentrated on developing party organizations through local and state-level electoral competition, through which they also reinforced the proregime-antiregime cleavage. An exploration of partisan alignment shows how the Fox campaign effectively exploited the regime-based cleavage to win the votes of weakly attached and independent voters. Finally, this study shows how the new structure of incentives for the parties—much closer electoral contestation and the existence of many fewer strong partisans—has forced all parties to adopt characteristics of catch-all parties, although not without much internal struggle over the implementation of what many regard as "U.S." electoral practices.

The Expanded Party System and Electoral Competitiveness

From the time it was founded as the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 until 1988, the PRI had never lost a presidential, gubernatorial, or federal senatorial race it contested. The PRI seldom won less than 98 percent of the federal deputy seats open every three years, even though the constitution's no reelection clause meant that PRI candidates

enjoyed no incumbency effect. Opposition party candidates infrequently contested and rarely won municipal elections. In the 1960s and 1970s, political scientists felt comfortable calling Mexico a hegemonic party system. They distinguished it from the single-party states of the former Soviet bloc because opposition parties could and did exist legally and politically, but they also recognized, by using the term *hegemonic*, that opposition parties posed no genuine challenge to the PRI (Sartori 1976; Craig and Cornelius 1995).

Before a major political reform in 1977, only three opposition parties existed legally, one of which, the PAN, was cast by the governing party as the conservative opposition to the "institutionalized revolution." After the 1977 reform, several small opposition parties emerged, mostly on the left, none with realistic expectations of replacing the PRI (see table 1 for vote shares of the parties). They did, however, present the image of ideologically driven opposition parties on the left and right flanking a party of the broad majority—the PRI—and offering representation to those Mexicans who did not fit in the broad middle.

The PRI's hegemony owed much to its revolutionary heritage as the party built by the victorious revolutionaries, the party that had brought land reform to the campesinos, labor rights to the working class, and economic development to Mexico as a whole. The PRI's hegemony also owed much to the party's corporatist structure, which channeled the electoral and other political participation of Mexico's peasants and unionized workers, and to a vast clientelistic network through which the ruling elite materially rewarded ambitious politicians who sought social mobility through politics and the social groups those politicians claimed to represent (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 74).

The PRI's monopoly on the elected executive positions at the federal, state, and local levels gave PRI leaders access to the governmental resources that made clientelism easy, particularly in a state with an extensive bureaucracy and a tendency toward intervention in the economy (Purcell and Purcell 1976). Opposition parties' failure to gain any executive positions made them unable to challenge the PRI electorally because they had no appointed posts with which to reward their supporters.

Economic modernization did produce gradual erosion of the PRI's commanding position electorally, as table 1 shows, but the key word is *gradual*—about 2 percent in each federal election. Opposition parties did markedly better in urban and industrial areas, where the population had greater access to education and the mass media (Ames 1970; Klesner 1993). In the vastness of rural Mexico, where the opposition feared to show itself, the PRI's vote totals sometimes reached numbers higher than the registered electorate. Whether such large numbers of campesinos voted enthusiastically for the PRI to reward it for giving them land or had their votes cast for them by rural bosses was unknown

Table 1. Federal Deputy Election Results, 1961–2003 (percent of vote)

	PAN	PRI	PPS	PARM	PDM	PCM PSUM PMS PRD	PST PFCRN PC	PVEM	PT	Other
1961	7.6	90.3	1.0	0.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
1964	11.5	86.3	1.4	0.7	—	—	—	—	—	—
1967	12.5	83.8	2.2	1.4	—	—	—	—	—	—
1970	14.2	83.6	1.4	0.8	—	—	—	—	—	—
1973	16.5	77.4	3.8	2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
1976	8.9	85.2	3.2	2.7	—	—	—	—	—	—
1979	11.4	74.2	2.7	1.9	2.2	5.3	2.2	—	—	—
1982	17.5	69.3	1.9	1.3	2.3	4.4	1.8	—	—	1.3
1985	16.3	68.2	2.1	1.7	2.9	3.4	2.6	—	—	2.9
1988	18.0	50.4	9.2	6.1	1.3	4.5	10.2	—	—	0.5
1991	17.7	61.4	1.8	2.1	1.1	8.3	4.3	1.4	1.1	1.5
1994	26.8	50.3	0.7	0.9	0.4	16.7	1.1	1.4	2.6	0.3
1997	25.8	38.0	0.3	—	0.7	25.0	1.1	3.7	2.5	0.1
2000	39.1[a]	37.8	—	0.8	—	19.1[a]	—	(a)	(a)	2.1
2003	31.8	38.1[b]	—	—	—	18.2	—	4.1[b]	2.5	5.3

[a]In 2000, PVEM formed Alliance for Change coalition with PAN; PT formed part of Alliance for Mexico coalition with PRD.
[b]In 2003, PRI and PVEM for Alliance for All (*Alianza para Todos*) in some districts. Alliance for All votes are included with PRI votes; PVEM votes include only those cast for nonaligned PVEM candidates.
Notes: Annulled votes have been excluded.
Source: Instituto Federal Electoral.

in individual districts because the urban press was no more willing to venture into such rural areas than the oppositionists. Endemic political corruption and electoral fraud ensured large vote tallies for the PRI, but even without them, the PRI would probably have been hegemonic. Mexican public policy in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and even into the 1970s produced rapid economic development, for which the electorate rewarded the PRI. Furthermore, opposition parties presented no real alternatives to PRI governance or to the PRI development strategy.

Nevertheless, PRI hegemony did erode. How has Mexican electoral politics changed? What is the new shape of the party system? To begin with, we can assess the competitiveness of the party system by measuring the number of effective parties across the nation. Juan Molinar's NP index (Molinar Horcasitas 1991b) provides a useful measure of competitiveness that has been employed by other studies of Mexico (Pacheco Méndez 1997; Klesner 1997). To measure the increase in com-

Table 2. Federal Electoral Districts, 1979–2003, by number of parties

Number of Parties (NP Index)	1979	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003
Tripartite (NP > 2.5)	0	1	3	89	1	33	56	70	66
Plural bipartism (2.0–2.5)	5	24	27	38	20	105	112	101	114
Pure bipartism (1.5–2.0)	53	70	71	43	92	89	107	100	100
Hegemonic (1.0–1.5)	242	205	199	130	187	73	25	29	23
Total	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300

NP index is defined by Molinar Horcasitas 1991b.
Source: IFE.

petitiveness in the party system, the three hundred federal deputy election districts have been grouped into four categories, following the procedure used by Guadalupe Pacheco Méndez (1997).[1]

- Hegemonic refers to districts in which a single party dominates (NP = 1.0 to 1.5).
- Pure bipartism (or two-party): districts where two parties compete (NP = 1.5 to 2.0).
- Plural bipartism (elsewhere labeled a two-and-a-half party system): districts in which two parties compete and are joined by a third, which is weaker (NP = 2.0 to 2.5).
- Tripartism (or multipartism): three (or more) parties effectively compete (NP > 2.5).

Table 2 shows how the three hundred electoral districts fell into those four categories in federal deputy elections since 1979.[2] It indicates that most electoral districts were hegemonic even as late as 1991; in 1979, fully five-sixths of the districts were hegemonic. The growth of competition came gradually until very recently, and in its earliest phases, competition existed only in urban and northern border settings. For example, in 1982, of the 95 nonhegemonic districts, all were in the largest metropolitan areas (Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey) and urban regions in the northern states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua (especially in Ciudad Juárez), Coahuila, and Tamaulipas (but only in Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros), as well as the city of Mérida in

the distant Yucatán. By 1997, however, fewer than 10 percent of the districts fell into the hegemonic category, and opposition parties won in 6 of the 25 cases. In 2000, the number of hegemonic districts rose to 29, but the Alliance for Change (that is, the PAN) won 19 of those. In 2003, competitiveness at the district level mirrored that of the 1997 and 2000 elections. Overall, that over 90 percent of the Mexican federal electoral districts are now competitive among two or more parties marks a profound change from the 1980s and before.

It is also important to recognize, however, that less than 25 percent (70 of 300 in 2000; 63 in 2003) of the electoral districts fall into the tripartism category. Mexico may have a three-party system in the congress and at the national level, but at the district level most competition is between two of the three parties; more specifically, between the PRI and one of the other two. Table 3 provides a disaggregation of the districts for the congressional elections in the 1990s, 2000, and 2003. The extent to which the district contests pitted one or the other "opposition" party against the PRI became very apparent by 1997. In that election, in slightly more than one-third of the districts (110 of 300), the PRI and the PAN squared off, the PAN winning 52 and the PRI 58 of those districts. Again in slightly more than one-third of the districts (114), the PRI and the PRD competed, the PRI again taking 58 and the PRD 56 seats each. In the election of 2000, the number of districts with effectively two-party competition (pure or plural bipartism) declined modestly (201 in 2000 compared to 219 in 1997; see table 2), but the PAN's success behind Fox meant that the distribution of those districts swung to the PAN from the PRD and that the PAN won 107 of the 170 districts in which it went head-to-head with the PRI.

The foregoing evidence suggests that Mexico is less a three-party system than a pair of two-party systems that may be evolving to genuine three-party competition across the nation, but only slowly. (The number of tripartite districts grew steadily in the 1990s, and by 2003, one new development had emerged: the PAN and the PRD squared off in 23 districts, all of them concentrated in the Mexico City area.) This point would be less remarkable if the districts in which two-party competition occurs were not geographically concentrated. The vast majority of districts in which the PRI and the PRD compete are in the south. Meanwhile, most of the districts in which the PAN and the PRI struggle mainly against each other are in the north and the center-west region, which is north and west of the capital.[3] Only the greater Mexico City area (here defined as the Federal District and the surrounding Estado de México) can be labeled tripartite or multipartite.

These data suggest that the PRI remains the party with the strongest and broadest national presence and that the PRD and the PAN, while becoming increasingly competitive across the nation, still have strong

Table 3. Federal Deputy Elections by District, 1991–2003

Type of District	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003
PRI Hegemonic	187	73	19	10	16
PRI-PAN Competition	90	134	110	170	146
PRI Wins Two-Party District	66	53	33	30	46
PRI Wins 2½ Party District	14	67	25	33	47
PAN Hegemonic	0	0	5	19	2
PAN Wins Two-Party District	7	6	18	52	21
PAN Wins 2½ Party District	3	8	29	36	30
PRI-PRD Competition	22	60	114	48	50
PRI Wins Two-Party District	19	29	33	14	14
PRI Wins 2½ Party District	3	26	25	24	13
PRD Hegemonic	0	0	1	0	5
PRD Wins Two-Party District	0	1	23	2	8
PRD Wins 2½ Party District	0	4	32	8	10
PAN-PRD Competition	0	0	0	2	23
Multipartism	1	33	56	70	63
PRI Wins	1	29	29	20	26
PAN Wins	0	4	13	32	24
PRD Wins	0	0	14	18	13
Other	0	0	1	0	2
Total	300	300	300	300	300

Source: Author's calculations based on data from IFE.

regional bases. To what extent do these regional bases merely reflect the different socioeconomic characteristics of the regions (which differ dramatically, as any observer of Mexico will quickly report)? To what extent might they reflect the difficulties for a new party in building a party organization and gathering electoral support across a nation as large and diverse as Mexico?

Where Do Party Supporters Come From?

To explore the first of these questions, we can undertake a multivariate regression analysis of the predictors of the parties' vote, using socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors as the explanatory variables. If the regional variables prove to be statistically insignificant, it would indicate they have no independent explanatory power, control-

ling for socioeconomic and demographic factors. Past studies of Mexican voting behavior using aggregate data at the state level (Ames 1970; Klesner 1987) and the district level (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1990; Klesner 1993, 1994, 1995) have found that urbanization, industrialization, and education are among the most powerful predictors of the percentage of the vote received by the PRI or its opposition in federal elections. This study uses aggregate data gathered at the level of the *municipio*, the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. county, to explore the relationship among electoral, socioeconomic, demographic, and regional variables.[4] Table 4 reports the results for the five federal deputy elections held since 1991.[5]

Here, urbanization is measured by the percentage of the population living in localities of greater than 20,000 and industrialization by the percentage of the population employed in manufacturing. As in other studies conducted with aggregate data (compare Klesner 1993), these measures prove to be significant predictors of the direction of the vote. Likewise, education (here measured by the literacy rate) is also a significant explanatory variable, as it has been in earlier studies with data aggregated at higher levels. In terms of these social structural variables, the PRI does well in *municipios* that are more rural and that have relatively low literacy. In 1991, it finished worse in areas that were more industrial, but in more recent elections it performed slightly better in industrial areas, controlling for other factors (such as urbanization and literacy).

This profile conforms to the broad understanding that the PRI has performed best where the population is uneducated and vulnerable because of lack of education, lack of access to urban-based media, and economic marginality in the countryside. Controlling for other factors, however, the PRI does slightly better in areas with a large part of the labor force in manufacturing, perhaps because of its longstanding corporatist relationship with organized labor.

The PAN's best performances, by contrast, are in *municipios* that are more urban, more industrialized, and higher in literacy, as earlier studies also suggested. Again, this fits with past descriptions of the PAN as a party with an urban, educated, middle-class base (for example, Barraza and Bizberg 1991; Mizrahi 2003).

The PRD's electoral base is less easy to describe in terms of these measures of socioeconomic modernization (note that the R^2 for the PRD equations is generally lower than for the PRI or the PAN). On the one hand, the PRD has become a party of nonindustrial areas, as the negative coefficients for the industrialization measure indicate. In the last two elections, it has finished somewhat better in more rural areas. On the other hand, in contrast to the PRI and the PAN, the role of education in the PRD vote is less clear. The one significant coefficient (1997) is positive, whereas for the other four elections the literacy coefficient was

Table 4. Federal Deputy Elections, 1991–2003 (multiple regression analysis)

	PAN					PRI					PRD				
Variable	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003
Constant	–0.12	–0.24	–0.28	–0.32	–0.13	0.80	0.55	0.93	0.92	0.65	0.17	0.52	0.30	0.40	0.27
Population in towns > 20,000 (%)	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.10	–0.13	–0.12	–0.12	–0.13	–0.10	–0.02	–0.01	–0.02	–0.05	–0.04
Population employed in manufacturing (%)	0.18	0.17	0.26	0.31	0.16	–0.13	–0.01	0.04	0.01	0.17	–0.10	–0.15	–0.29	–0.30	–0.27
Catholic %	0.12	0.25	0.27	0.20	0.13	–0.04	0.09	–0.17	–0.13	–0.17	–0.02	–0.37	–0.16	–0.09	0.06
Literate %	0.08	0.33	0.15	0.42	0.23	–0.04	–0.10	–0.36	–0.41	–0.13	–0.06	–0.04	0.21	–0.04	–0.06
North	0.09	0.03	0.11	–0.02	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.05	–0.04	–0.07	–0.13	–0.04	–0.05
South	–0.01	–0.02	0.03	–0.01	0.01	0.03	–0.01	–0.01	–0.01	–0.02	–0.01	0.04	–0.01	0.03	–0.01
Mexico City area	–0.02	–0.07	–0.08	–0.08	–0.06	–0.11	–0.03	–0.09	–0.06	–0.16	0.05	0.07	0.14	0.12	0.22
Center–West	0.07	0.05	0.14	0.04	0.06	–0.03	–0.02	–0.05	–0.02	–0.04	0.02	–0.01	–0.08	–0.01	–0.02
R^2	0.45	0.60	0.48	0.54	0.27	0.49	0.41	0.62	0.63	0.50	0.15	0.34	0.40	0.32	0.40
N (number of *municipios*)	2,412	2,407	2,411	2,426	2,417	2,412	2,407	2,411	2,424	2,426	2,412	2,407	2,411	2,426	2,417

Notes: Unstandardized ordinary least squares estimates. Cases have been weighted by population. All coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level.
Sources: Electoral data: IFE; demographic and socioeconomic data: INEGI.

negative but insignificant. This suggests that the PRI does well in rural areas where the population is less educated, while the PRD does better in all areas (rural and urban—note that the urbanization variable's coefficient equals nearly zero) where the manufacturing base is weak but the population is somewhat better educated.

Because the data used here are aggregate data, we must be careful not to incur the ecological fallacy of inferring individual behavior from aggregate characteristics (Robinson 1950). Table 5 offers individual-level data from the 2000 Consulta/Mitofsky exit poll that confirm many of the conclusions from the multiple regression analysis of aggregate data in table 4.[6] As table 5 shows, PRI voters have tended to be less educated and more rural in residence; they also tend to be older and poorer than the average Mexican voter. PAN voters, in contrast, are more educated and more likely to be urbanites; they are younger and earn higher incomes than average voters. Those casting ballots for the PRD's presidential candidate in 2000 were somewhat more likely to be rural dwellers than the average voter, and about average in terms of education. Cárdenas was somewhat more likely to win over older Mexicans than younger, and the poor rather than the better off. The PRI's Labastida did better with women voters than with men, but the gender gap was not substantial in the 2000 race.

One other variable proves to provide significant explanatory power in the multiple regression analysis: the percentage of the population that is Catholic. Of course, this variable does not measure the religiosity of the population, simply the percentage that declares itself Catholic to census takers. However, because the level of aggregation used here is relatively low, there is greater variance in this variable than has been available to those conducting ecological analyses of Mexican elections with district- or state-level data. As we might hypothesize, given the PAN's history of close identification with the church and its social Christian message (Mabry 1974; Loaeza 1999), the PAN performs well in *municipios* with a higher percentage of Catholics. In contrast, the PRD and the PRI, both strongly secular in their ideology, perform more poorly in districts with higher concentrations of self-declared Catholics.

This finding runs somewhat at variance with studies that have suggested that partisanship is unrelated to religion in Mexico (for example, Camp 1994). Here it is particularly important to avoid the ecological fallacy; aggregate data measure the number of self-declared Catholics, whereas individual-level data gathered through surveys typically attempt to measure the religiosity of individuals (for example, by asking how frequently one attends religious services). The aggregate statistic probably captures the self-identification of some Mexicans as "Catholic," meaning not secular. Examining state-level data reporting the percentage of the population that declares itself Catholic, one finds the highest

Table 5. Social and Regional Bases of the 2000 Presidential Vote

Variable	Fox PAN	Labastida PRI	Cárdenas PRD	Total
Sex				
Men	45.6	34.8	16.8	49.0
Women	42.5	39.2	15.2	50.8
Age				
Under 30	49.0	32.4	14.8	31.6
30–45	45.6	35.5	15.8	38.1
45–59	38.7	41.8	17.2	19.7
60+	33.0	47.2	17.9	10.5
Education				
None	23.3	54.6	19.9	7.1
Primary	33.2	47.5	17.1	34.0
Secondary	47.5	34.1	15.6	21.1
Preparatory	52.8	28.2	14.7	18.0
University	58.3	23.9	14.4	19.9
Residence				
Urban	50.0	31.9	14.8	80.5
Rural	26.0	51.9	19.5	19.5
Income (no. minimum salaries)				
<1	30.3	49.0	18.4	27.6
1–3	43.0	36.8	17.1	28.4
3–5	50.7	30.1	15.3	14.8
5–10	56.2	27.6	12.9	13.3
>10	65.1	22.5	9.7	8.1
Region				
North	43.4	45.6	8.9	25.6
Center-West	51.0	32.3	14.3	20.2
Mexico City area	46.4	26.7	22.3	27.2
Center	42.4	40.5	14.2	8.8
South	34.5	44.0	19.0	18.5
Total	44.0	37.0	16.0	—

N = 37,062. Cell entries are row percentages for PAN, PRI, and PRD.
Note: Responses of Don't Know/No Answer excluded. Votes for other candidates excluded.
Source: Mitofsky/Consulta 2000.

figures in the states where the Cristero War between the anticlerical Calles administration and the pro-Church Cristero movement raged most intensely in the late 1920s (Meyer 1979). The aggregate statistics reporting religious identity probably incorporate an artifact of this intense church-state conflict—a conflict in which the PRI's founder, President Plutarco Elías Calles, played the central role. In contrast, religiosity (as measured by an individual's frequency of attending services) is not unique to the Catholic faith and may be completely unaffected by one's heritage in regard to the Cristero War. Studies using individual-level data have shown that more religious Mexicans actually prefer the PRI over the PAN (Moreno 2003, 174–75).

While these demographic, socioeconomic, and religious variables prove to be significant explanatory factors for predicting the percentage of the vote going to the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD, they only contribute about half of the explanatory power of the models displayed in table 4. Factoring in regional variables greatly improves the explanatory power of the models. In table 4, how much region matters to the vote for the parties is indicated by the regression coefficients. In these models, the constant indicates the share of the vote that would go to the party in question if the values of all the other variables were zero in the central region—that is, in the states surrounding the greater Mexico City area but not including the capital city and its environs (Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala). The regression coeffient for each regional dummy variable indicates what must be added to the constant to obtain that region's intercept. In effect, it indicates the percentage of the vote that the party gains or loses over the base case (the central region) by being in that particular region.

So, for example, in the north in 1997, the PAN performed 11 percent better than the base case. In the center-west, the PAN performed 14 percent above the base case, while in the greater Mexico City area it performed 8 percent below the base case. Looking at the four elections together, we can say that, controlling for other factors, the PAN regularly overperformed in the center-west and underperformed in Mexico City. Except in the election of 2000, it also overperformed in the north.

Conversely, controlling for other explanatory factors, the PRD often finished by as much as 4 to 7 percent below the base case in the north, and did even worse in 1997. In greater Mexico City, however, the PRD finished as much as 22 percent above the base case (in the most recent election). Regionally, then, the PRD's strengths are the converse of the PAN's. Evidence in table 5 from individual-level data confirm the conclusions from aggregate data analysis regarding the regional distribution of party support.[7]

We should also note that the size of the regression coefficients for region declined for the election of 2000. This outcome reflects the

nationalization of the PAN's campaign efforts under Vicente Fox. Fox's vigorous campaign and his use of television allowed him to reach a national audience more effectively than earlier candidates and to score important gains for the PAN throughout the country. Indeed, as table 5 indicates, Fox led the PRD's Cárdenas in all regions of the country in the July 2000 election. Fox's coattails, furthermore, were especially long in 2000, as the 2003 results suggest. In 2003, however, the PRD recouped some of the states and districts it had won in 1997 but lost to the PAN in 2000. Indeed, 25 districts won by the PAN in 2000 went to the PRD in 2003, mostly in the Federal District.

This multiple regression analysis thus supports the argument that Mexico's party system has regional dimensions even beyond what would be expected given the already considerable differences of the regions on the standard measures of socioeconomic modernization and religion. In the 1990s, the two major parties of opposition became more competitive and thereby raised the degree of contestation in Mexico's electoral system. However, the analysis displayed in table 4 indicates that the parties have divided the labor of creating competitiveness along regional lines. The result is less three-party contestation in each part of the country and many examples of two-party competition with the PRI present everywhere.

Two-party competition can have important consequences for party strategies. As scholars of party systems have often noted, where two parties compete to claim single prizes—governorships, city halls, or congressional seats in winner-take-all districts, for example—those parties must strive to win majorities, and therefore they must appeal to a broad middle swath of the electorate. Centripetal forces therefore are at work in such situations, encouraging the parties to cast their campaign appeals and ideology in more moderate terms that will appeal to those voters who sit in the middle of the ideological spectrum (Duverger 1954; Downs 1957; Sartori 1976). Indeed, to the extent that the competition becomes localized, centering on state and local government, it may begin to turn on issues of experience and capacity to govern rather than ideology or national policy issues. Furthermore, once two-party competition with a local or state-level dimension has been consolidated, other parties find it difficult to make electoral gains. Such two-party electoral dynamics seem to be at work in much of Mexico today, with critical consequences for the parties' strategies.

As an example of the dynamics of this competition, we might consider the state of Chihuahua. The PAN made some of its earliest inroads in Chihuahua, winning city halls in the city of Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez in 1983 and then taking the governor's seat in 1992, along with the Juárez City Hall. The PAN made good government its message in Chihuahua (Rodríguez and Ward 1992). The PRI, however, did not con-

cede the state to the PAN. It fought an ugly battle to regain control of the state in 1986 that put the credibility of the electoral process in question for many Mexicans (Molinar Horcasitas 1991a). Along the way, it adopted the PAN's northern message and strategy, including a promarket development platform and the recruitment of business entrepreneurs as candidates. In 1998, in an effort to regain the statehouse by putting forward a strong gubernatorial candidate, the PRI introduced a party primary to select its nominee (Klesner 1999). While the PAN held on to Ciudad Juárez, the PRI won the gubernatorial race in 1998. In 2004, the PRI ousted the PAN from control of Juárez, too. Throughout this period, the two parties put forward candidates whose characteristics and messages differed little, other than who had held power in the previous term and what connections they had with the party in power in Mexico City. Despite the presence of two large industrial cities, Chihuahua and Juárez, with significant numbers of poor workers, moreover, the PRD has made almost no inroads in the state.

The foregoing argument assumes that voters are available to be won over to a competitor's anti-incumbent message.[8] Scholars of elections have developed two major ways of explaining how such voters are won over. On the one hand, those following a stricter rational choice approach would argue that individuals will choose between the incumbent party and the challenger based on some combination of assessments of past performance and promises of future success. This approach, in its strictest form, assumes that all voters are available to be won over to a challenger's message, depending mainly on the assessments of incumbent party's performance (see, for example, Popkin et al. 1976; Fiorina 1979). On the other hand, those following the Michigan approach to the study of voting behavior emphasize the role of partisan attachment in removing significant blocs of voters from availability for conversion to a challenger's campaign (for example, Campbell et al. 1960). Once voters attach themselves to a party (often in their formative years), they rarely shift partisan identity.

The debate about the role of partisanship and its electoral consequences points to two questions relevant to the Mexican case: First, does the concept of partisan identity, useful though it has been in the context of the United States and Europe, travel well to Mexico? Mexican electoral analysts have employed partisanship as an independent variable for explaining voter choice, but they have differed about how to operationalize the concept. Domínguez and McCann (1996), for instance, did not include partisan attachment in their models of vote choice in the 1988 and 1991 elections, although they found previous voting behavior to be a strong predictor of electoral choice. Moreno and Yanner (2000), in contrast, explicitly included partisan attachment in one of their models of voter choice in the 1994 presidential election. They found partisanship

to be a powerful predictor of the direction of the vote. Moreno's subsequent work (2003) explores Mexican voting behavior with partisan identity at the heart of his model. While not rejecting the insights that the rational choice perspective brings to the analysis of voting behavior, this study finds the view that some Mexican voters are more available to be won over to challengers than more attached partisans to be convincing, and the foregoing analysis incorporates that outlook.

A second question about partisan attachment in Mexico revolves around the issue of alignment, realignment, and dealignment. Here the relevant substantive question is whether and how partisan attachment has evolved in Mexico. Given that partisan attachment proves to be a strong predictor of voter choice (Moreno 2003), how much did it diminish during the 1990s? What proportion of the Mexican electorate is available to be convinced by challengers?

Has the Mexican Electorate Been Realigned?

The analyses presented in tables 2 through 5 suggest that the Mexican electorate is now divided into three parts: an urban, educated, relatively wealthy, and more Catholic Mexico of the north and the center-west supporting the PAN; a poorer, less-educated, more rural Mexico voting for the PRI, especially outside of the huge Mexico City metropolis; and a poorer and more rural Mexico of the south, along with the Mexico City area, sustaining the PRD. But has Mexico experienced a critical election that has realigned the electorate in the way that students of U.S. elections have identified critical elections (Key 1955; Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983)? Or has Mexico gone the way of many of the industrialized democracies and witnessed a dealignment of its electorate?

Scholars debated this question more than a decade ago, after the 1988 election. Dealignment would suggest that significant social groups had ceased to support any party, thereby increasing the portion of the electorate available to serve as swing voters and potentially to respond to campaign messages (compare Dalton et al.1984). In contrast, realignment generally means "a significant shift in the group bases of party coalitions, and usually in the distribution of popular support among the parties as a result" (Dalton et al. 1984, 13). The debate then centered on how to characterize a realignment. Certainly, a realignment of social groups in the electorate to yield firm support of particular groups for each of the two opposition parties had not occurred by the early 1990s. Therefore, some studies based on aggregate electoral data concluded that because of the urbanization and other aspects of socioeconomic modernization of the postwar period, a decoupling of the electorate from overwhelming support for the PRI had taken place (Craig and Cor-

nelius 1995). However, that secular decline in support for the PRI did not imply that a realignment to support for other parties could be identified (Klesner 1993, 1994).

Others argued that analysts had to conceptualize the cleavage structure of Mexico not in conventional, socioeconomic terms but rather in terms of proregime and antiregime camps (Molinar Horcasitas 1989, 1991a). If realignment were defined as the development of a bloc of antiregime (hence, anti-PRI) voters, then 1988 might be taken as a critical (or realigning) election (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1990).

One useful measure of partisan alignment comes from the responses to questions posed by survey researchers to potential voters: with which party do you most sympathize?[9] Table 6 presents the responses from eight separate polls conducted in Mexico over the past two decades. By 1997, the portion of the electorate willing to express PRI partisanship had declined by more than one-third from where it had been only three years earlier, from 48 percent in 1994 to 30 percent.[10] PRI partisanship remained at relatively lower levels (in the mid-30s) throughout the 2000 campaign before dipping again after the PRI took its loss in July 2000 (Mexico 2000 Panel Study, First, Second, Third, and Fourth Waves, February, May, June, July 2000). However, PAN and (especially) PRD partisanship has been rather unstable, fluctuating back and forth over the last decade along with the fortunes of those two parties.

Perhaps equally notable is the large percentage of voters who remain independent, not identifying with any party or unwilling or unable to express a partisan identity. That figure (the sum of "none" and "don't know/no answer") has varied from around 23 to 35 percent of the electorate (ignoring the 1988 figures, which seem anomalous in this series). This is a large enough body of voters to swing an election once the PRI's partisan identifiers have declined to under a third of the electorate. Certainly some movement of the electorate from the PRI to the other two major parties has taken place. However, the extent to which voters who supported the PAN and Vicente Fox in 2000 have remained firmly in that camp is as questionable as the extent to which enthusiasts of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had firmly attached themselves to the PRD after 1997. The swing away from PAN partisan identity since July 2000 is notable in table 6, mirroring the defections of Fox voters from PAN deputy candidates in the 2003 congressional race. In addition, there seems to have been no further dealignment of the electorate since the mid-1990s; that is, the unattached share of the electorate remains at about one-third. These trends can be interpreted to indicate that the Mexican electorate has undergone dealignment but not realignment.

With one-third of the electorate independent or unable to identify with a party, there remained enough unattached voters and oppositionists willing to cast what may have been strategic ballots to make a dif-

Table 6. Partisanship in Mexico, 1986–2003 (from major surveys)

Survey	PRI	PAN	PRD	None	Don't Know/No Answer	Other	N =
New York Times, 1986	46	16	—	32	1	6	1,576
Gallup Pre-Election, 1988	45	20	21[a]	10	1	3	2,960
Beldon-Russonello Pre-Election, 1994	48	16	7	—	25	2	1,526
ITAM Post-Election, 1997	30	22	22	18	5	3	1,243
Mexico 2000 Panel Study, Third Wave, June 2000	35	23	10	30	2	—	1,288
Democracy through Mexican Lenses, October 2000	29	31	10	27	8	1	932
Mexico 2000 Panel Study, Fifth Wave, May 2002	29	27	9	31	3	—	994
Reforma Exit Poll, July 2003	29	25	13	28	—	—	2,498

[a]The PRD did not come into existence until after 1988. The figure for the PRD in 1988 reflects the sum of partisan preferences expressed for the parties composing the National Democratic Front (FDN), those which supported the 1988 presidential candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.

Sources: *New York Times* 1986; Gallup 1988; ITAM 1997; Belden and Russonello 1994; Mexico 2000 Panel Study, Third Wave. 2000; Democracy through Mexican Lenses 2000; Mexico 2000 Panel Study, Fifth Wave, 2002; *Reforma* 2003.

ference in Fox's campaign to seize the presidency and end one-party dominance. Indeed, the uncertainty of the electorate made the prediction of the campaign's outcome very difficult for pollsters and pundits. As late as early June 2000, fully 30 percent of respondents to the third round of the Mexico 2000 Panel Survey claimed that they had not decided how they would vote (Mexico 2000 Panel Study, Third Wave, June 2–14, 2000). As it turned out, plenty of voters behaved differently than they had in the recent past. Of the Fox voters among the respondents to the Mitofsky/Consulta Exit Poll who could remember and would report their 1997 congressional vote, 38.8 percent had not voted

Table 7. The 2000 Presidential Choice: Retrospective and Prospective Votes

	Fox PAN	Labastida PRI	Cárdenas PRD
Congressional Vote, 1997			
PAN	86.9	7.6	3.2
PRI	16.5	75.5	6.2
PRD	31.1	5.6	61.5
Nonvoter/Don't Remember	46.7	33.4	15.9
Presidential Vote, 1994			
PAN	86.6	7.8	2.9
PRI	21.8	69.6	6.6
PRD	27.7	5.7	64.6
Nonvoter/Don't Remember	45.9	33.9	16.0
Congressional Vote, 2003			
PAN	52.0	6.8	6.3
PRI	16.4	79.9	3.8
PRD	16.3	4.5	79.1

Source: Consulta Mitofsky 2000, N = 6,197; Consulta Mitofsky 2003.

in 1997, 11.7 percent had voted for the PRI, and 7.7 percent had voted for the PRD in the most recent election. Only 40.7 percent of the respondents to that exit poll who voted for Fox had voted for the PAN in 1997. In contrast, of the voters who supported the PRI's Francisco Labastida in 2000, 61.6 percent had voted for the PRI in 1997 and 32.5 percent had not voted in the last congressional election. Fully 37.9 percent of those who chose Cárdenas in 2000 had not voted in 1997, but only 4.4 percent of his votes came from those who supported the PAN in 1997. Of the 3.5 percent of total 2000 voters who switched between the PAN and the PRD, 2.9 percent moved to the PAN from the PRD, while only 0.6 percent went in the opposite direction.

Thus there was much fluidity in the electorate, especially with the large number of new voters and the return of those who had recently abstained. A significant part of the partisan dealignment in Mexico comes from the entry of new voters into the electorate. Effective campaigners (Cárdenas and the PRD in 1997, Fox in 2000) have been able to win their votes, if not their permanent allegiance to their parties.

Table 7 offers another perspective on vote switching and partisan loyalty in 2000 and 2003. As the table indicates, Fox gained nearly a majority of those who did not vote or could not remember their 1997 vote (46.7 percent), and he similarly won the ballots of a near-majority

Table 8. Political Characteristics of Loyalists and Defectors (change, 1997–2000)

	Loyalists			Defectors		
Variable	PAN	PRI	PRD	PRI to PAN	PRD to PAN	Nonvoter to PAN
Partisanship						
PAN	76.0	2.7	0.7	26.5	43.0	2.6
PRI	1.1	86.5	0.8	27.7	2.8	4.8
PRD	0.3	0.4	75.8	1.1	14.0	46.9
Other	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.9	0.2	0.8
None	20.9	8.7	21.4	41.1	38.3	36.3
Don't Know/ No Answer	1.3	1.2	0.6	1.8	1.8	8.5
Self-Reported Voting Record						
Always Vote for the Same Party	65.9	89.1	65.6	29.3	17.3	37.0
Sometimes Vote for One Party, Sometimes for Another	29.5	9.8	28.2	63.9	76.2	44.8
Neither	4.2	0.7	6.2	6.3	5.9	14.8
No Answer	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.7	3.4
Presidential Vote, 1994						
Did not vote	11.1	9.0	11.9	17.3	11.2	51.2
PAN	75.8	1.9	1.8	8.4	19.4	2.4
PRI	6.9	84.9	4.9	64.5	16.7	10.7
PRD	1.6	1.1	77.5	2.0	46.5	17.9
Other/No Answer	1.3	0.4	0.7	2.0	1.0	5.3
Do not remember	3.4	2.7	3.2	5.8	5.1	12.7
Percent of total sample[a]	15.5	20.0	5.9	4.5	2.9	14.8

[a]Table excludes voters for smaller parties (3.0% of the total sample); 1997 PAN voters (2.3%) and 1997 nonvoters (16.8%) who voted for any other party in 2000; and those who could not remember or would not report their 1997 vote (13.7%). N = 6,196.
Source: Consulta Mitofsky 2000.

of the same categories of voters from 1994 (45.9 percent). PAN voters from 1994 and 1997 were more loyal to their party than were PRI or PRD voters, with former PRD voters being the most likely to switch to the PAN in 2000. This evidence suggests that the "opposition" vote—that

Table 9. Social Characteristics of Loyalists and Defectors (change, 1997–2000)

	Loyalists			Defectors		
Variable	PAN	PRI	PRD	PRI to PAN	PRD to PAN	Nonvoter to PAN
Mean Age	39.9	43.7	41.7	39.3	43.6	34.7
Sex						
Male	54.4	47.0	55.5	51.3	63.0	44.2
Female	45.6	53.0	44.5	48.7	37.0	55.8
Income (number of minimum salaries)						
0–1	15.2	38.6	27.8	25.6	16.8	28.8
1–3	21.5	25.7	25.9	26.7	24.9	32.4
3–5	18.3	11.8	15.2	13.5	15.5	12.9
5–10	20.1	10.2	13.6	16.1	22.1	11.7
10+	19.3	5.7	11.1	10.7	13.0	2.8
Don't Know/ No Answer	5.6	7.9	6.5	7.5	7.6	12.5
Education						
None	2.7	11.0	6.7	6.2	1.6	7.3
Primary	21.5	46.4	32.1	30.8	19.4	37.0
Secondary	21.2	17.5	16.0	18.7	18.0	21.9
Preparatory	20.4	11.9	19.1	19.4	24.3	19.9
University	34.2	13.2	26.0	24.9	36.6	14.0
Urban or Rural						
Urban	92.3	72.3	80.0	86.7	93.2	80.3
Rural	7.7	27.7	20.0	13.3	6.8	19.7
Percent of total sample[a]	15.5	20.0	5.9	4.5	2.9	14.8

See notes to table 8.

for the PAN and the PRD—may to some extent have been a strategic vote of those seeking to oust the PRI by casting votes for whichever of the two parties of opposition they saw as most likely to defeat the former ruling party.

Late in the 2000 presidential campaign, Fox explicitly appealed to this opposition vote, urging voters who opposed the continuation of PRI rule to cast a *voto útil* (useful or strategic vote) for him even if they sympathized with Cárdenas and the PRD. But as table 7 also hints in its bottom panel, the PAN appears to have been unable to hold on to those

strategic voters in the 2003 race, receiving only about half (52 percent) of the Fox voters who returned to the polls in 2003. About one-third of those Fox voters cast ballots for one of the other main parties in 2003 and another 14 percent for the PVEM or one of the minor parties.

Some additional evidence about strategic voting can be found in table 8. Among voters who defected from either the PRD or the PRI to the PAN in 2000, large majorities reported that they usually switched votes. Defectors from the PRD to the PAN were more likely to report PAN partisan identity than PRD partisan identity, hinting that their 1997 voting behavior was strategic, too.[11] It is interesting that in the important category of those who did not go the polls in 1997 but voted for Fox in 2000, almost a majority reported PRD partisanship and more than one-third claimed to be independent. A majority of this last category did not vote in the 1994 presidential election, either, probably because of their youth (see table 9, where their mean age is nearly five years younger than any of the other categories reported in tables 8 and 9). Furthermore, almost none of those who did vote in 1994 chose the PAN's Diego Fernández de Cevallos. In short, this near-15 percent of 2000 voters were newly won to the PAN by Fox, again, probably temporarily. That is, the 2000 election does not appear to have been a critical or realigning election that served to cement these voters to the PAN (Lawson and Klesner 2002).

Table 8 tells about partisan alignment as well as vote switching. For example, PRI loyalists account for 20 percent of the electorate, and this seems to be a hardcore 20 percent, because almost none claim partisanship in another party or admit having voted for another party's presidential candidate in 1994. PAN and PRD stand-patters are more willing to admit voting and being willing to vote for other parties. However, the PAN and PRD loyalists together account for about the same share of the electorate (21.4 percent) as the PRI loyalists. Together, the loyalists formed less than half of the votes cast in the 2000 election.

Who falls into the categories of loyalists, defectors, and new PAN voters? Table 9 provides indications of the social bases of these groups. PRI loyalists are older, more likely to be female, poorer, less educated, and more likely to live in rural locales than other voters. These data confirm the ecological evidence about PRI voting shown in table 4. PAN loyalists, in contrast, are younger, more likely to be male, wealthier, better educated, and much more likely to live in urban abodes than other citizens. Again, this evidence supports the ecological findings reported earlier. PRD loyalists are also more likely to live in rural areas and to be poorer than PAN loyalists, but in contrast to PRI loyalists they are better educated, somewhat younger, and more often male.

Comparing PRI and PRD loyalists to 1997 PRI and PRD voters who switched to the PAN in 2000, we see that PRI defectors are younger, more

likely to be male, wealthier, much better educated, and more likely to live in urban areas than PRI loyalists. Similarly, PRD defectors are wealthier, much more likely to be male, more likely to live in urban areas, and especially much better educated than PRD loyalists. Indeed, over 60 percent of PRD defectors have preparatory or university educations. In short, Fox and his Alliance for Change coalition won over those intellectuals and other well-educated voters who had supported the PRD in 1997 and, in general, those most able to exercise political choice—citizens having greater access to information because of their higher levels of education, their higher incomes, and their urban residence.

Finally, in the critical category of 1997 nonvoters who chose Fox in 2000, we see that this group's profile looks very similar to PRI and PRD stand-patters except for its youth. This again raises a critical question for future elections; namely, whether Fox has won over to the PAN a group of younger voters, the majority of them female, who would have voted for the PRI or the PRD and perhaps would have become PRI or PRD partisans had they joined the electorate in 1988 or earlier. The evidence remains somewhat inconclusive on this generational matter, however. That Fox and the PAN did much better with younger voters than with older voters is clear, as table 10 shows. However, they did not do significantly better with newest cohort of voters than with those who were up to 50 years of age.

Table 10 divides the electorate into five groups: those who came of age before the events of 1968 that tarnished the PRI-ruled regime's image, those who came into the electorate after 1968 but before the onset of the economic crisis in 1982, those who turned 18 during the worst of the economic downturn of the 1980s under Miguel de la Madrid's presidency, those who first voted when Carlos Salinas was restructuring the economy, and those who came of political age during the democratizing reforms of Ernesto Zedillo. In terms of voting behavior in 2000, table 10 clearly indicates that the critical generational divide came in 1968. However, if we look at partisan identity, the picture is less clear. Certainly 1968 is a critical divide for PRI partisan identity and independents—respondents who came of age before 1968 are more likely to express affinity with the PRI and less likely to be independent. This finding lends support to those who have argued that the key cleavage in Mexican politics has had to do with the legitimacy of the regime rather than economic crisis (compare Molinar Horcasitas 1991a; Magaloni 1999). PRI partisanship does tend to grow in a direct relationship with age. PAN partisanship, in contrast, declines with age, and 1988 (the Salinas election) presents an important divide for PAN identifiers: those who became eligible to vote after 1988 are more likely to be PAN partisans than older age cohorts.

The finding that generational replacement may be reshaping Mexican partisan alignment can complement arguments that the main line of

Table 10. Presidential Vote and Party Identity by Age Group, 2000

Age Cohort	Presidential Vote: Fox PAN	Presidential Vote: Labastida PRI	Presidential Vote: Cárdenas PRD	Partisanship: PAN	Partisanship: PRI	Partisanship: PRD	Partisanship: None	Age Group as percent of total
Under 24 (Zedillo cohort)	48.7	31.7	15.5	30.6	24.2	9.3	29.6	14.2
24–30 (Salinas cohort)	49.3	33.0	14.6	28.9	27.6	8.1	28.6	17.4
30–36 (De la Madrid cohort)	46.6	34.7	15.3	22.2	29.4	10.1	29.0	16.4
36–50 (from 1968 to the economic crisis)	44.4	36.9	16.4	24.2	30.5	8.8	27.0	30.2
Over 50 (before 1968)	34.7	45.6	17.7	21.4	35.8	11.9	19.2	21.8
Total	44.0	37.0	16.0	24.9	30.0	9.6	26.3	100.0

Source: Consulta Mitofsky 2000.

division in the electorate was related to regime issues rather than class or ethnic divisions (Molinar Horcasitas 1989; Moreno 1998). The survey data offer a number of indications of the extent to which a cleavage divided those in favor of retaining the status quo (PRI hegemony) from those advocating change in the regime. First, when asked to create a left-right map of the Mexican party system, survey respondents did not place the parties in the ideological locations that political analysts and the parties themselves have generally put them—the PRI in the center, flanked by the PAN on the right and the PRD on the left. Respondents did place the PRD on the left, but they placed the PRI the most to the right, with the PAN in the center (Moreno 1998). This mapping of the party system suggests that the underlying political dimension being mapped is not preferences on socioeconomic policy or church-state relations or ethnic politics, as we often find in other nations, but proregime (right) versus antiregime (left) attitudes.[12]

Second, when asked to give the principal reason for their presidential vote in 2000, more than half the Fox voters (53.4 percent) listed "change" as their reason for choosing the Alliance for Change candidate. "Change" was also the most often chosen reason for voting for the PRD's Cárdenas (29.0 percent). In contrast, 23.3 percent of voters for PRI candidate Labastida said they chose him following their "habit" (the modal answer), and amazingly enough, 7 percent said they did not know why they voted for Labastida. Overall, almost one-third of the electorate (31.3 percent) in July 2000 cast their votes for "change" (Mexico 2000 Panel Study, Fourth Wave, July 2000).

These data certainly support the notion that a proregime versus antiregime cleavage ran through the electorate in the recent past and on up through Fox's election. That cleavage has age and education dimensions to it. Older voters were more likely to say that they always supported the same party or that they voted so that the PRI would win, whereas voters under 50 were more likely to report that they voted for "change" in July 2000. Younger voters were also more likely to have chosen their candidate on the basis of his proposals, as were those with higher levels of education. The less well educated were more likely to report always voting for the same party, while the better educated were more likely to say that they voted for "change."

What the preceding analysis sums up in terms of patterns of alignment in the Mexican party system is the following. Up through the election of 2000, Molinar's argument that the primary cleavage in Mexican politics revolved around regime issues can be supported by survey data (see also Moreno 1998). In terms of the social characteristics of those falling on either side of the proregime versus antiregime divide, regime supporters (or those seeking to maintain the political status quo) were older and less educated than regime opponents. These characteristics

happen to parallel some of the social attributes of those who have supported the PRI and the PAN. In addition, however, there are some other social factors that explain PAN, PRI, and PRD voting. Besides being younger and better educated than PRI voters, PAN supporters are wealthier, more urban, and more likely to come from the north and center-west and from areas with higher proportions of the population professing Catholicism. PRI supporters are the converse.

These are not new divisions; they characterized the social bases of the parties 20 years ago (Klesner 1987). What has happened in the interval is that the PAN has made deeper inroads into those social groups or, what is effectively the same thing, the PRI has lost further ground among those groups. In addition, we must note that the demographic and socioeconomic groups that the PRI has counted on to be its base have been declining in their size relative to those from which the PAN has made gains in the past two decades.

That said, Vicente Fox made important gains in his 2000 campaign by drawing on younger, formerly nonvoting members of the social groups that otherwise supported the PRI and by winning voters from the PRD in those social groups that often supported the PAN. The latter include the change-oriented citizens who have fallen on the antiregime side of the regime cleavage. Some of those voters returned to their old partisan preferences in the elections of 2003. As yet unanswered is the question of whether Fox's election has broken the old social alignments in Mexico. Such a development would probably lead the nation to a party system that revolves around catch-all parties, of which the PRI remains the most national, with the other two major parties steadily spreading their organizations and electoral appeal beyond their formerly regional bases.

Ideology and Strategy as Reflections of Electoral Incentives

The electoral competition and the social bases of Mexico's main political parties described so far go a long way toward explaining the evolution of those parties in the past dozen years. The party system's current shape and character might be summarized as follows. A three-party system at the national level, the party system has functioned as a pair of two-party systems outside the greater Mexico City area. The PAN became the PRI's main competitor in the north and the center-west because of the PAN's promarket ideology (attractive to northerners) and its embrace of Catholic social philosophy (appealing to the Catholic Bajío). The PRD became the PRI's opponent in the south because of its greater emphasis on distributive justice and its economic nationalism, important in a region with endemic poverty and inequality and espe-

cially threatened by the forces of economic globalization. Yet the dynamics of two-party systems create incentives for those parties to operate as catch-all parties.

Of course, the PAN and the PRD did not originate as catch-all parties, and they continue to attract both activists and voters on the basis of their ideological placement (following the conventional left-right scale based on class and socioeconomic issues). Consequently, those two parties have suffered internal tensions based on the challenge of accommodating differences among party elites about ideology and strategy. The PRI, too, has confronted internal struggles based on strategic and ideological conflicts, especially as its electoral fortunes have plummeted since the late 1990s. Briefly examining each party's evolution in the past dozen years can provide a clearer view of the current dimensions of the party system and illustrate how the electoral competition described here has shaped the parties' recent development.

The PAN

The PAN was founded by a group of Catholic activists, businessmen, and professionals whose principal grievances against the regime were the loss of the Church's rights; the struggle for religious liberty, including freedom for Catholics to educate their children in parochial schools; and the Mexican state's move toward socialism under Lázaro Cárdenas (Mabry 1974; Loaeza 1999). The PAN was the strongest opposition party from its origins in 1939 until Fox unseated the PRI from the presidency. Yet for decades it remained largely a loyal opposition, represented by a handful (at most) of deputies in the congress, debating within itself how to influence those in power, how to educate the Mexican citizenry about democracy and social Christian political philosophy, and whether participating in the electoral arena was conducive to accomplishing its objectives or simply an accommodation to those who ruled.

The nationalization of the banks in 1982 and the onset of economic crisis in the mid-1980s gave new life to a party unsure of its future. Many infuriated businesspeople and middle-class citizens flocked to the PAN as the most efficacious alternative to a PRI they saw as too populist and too overbearing (Mizrahi 1994, 2003). The party's new constituents and militants, often called "barbarians of the north" because so many of them came from the northern states, generated both a much-needed electoral energy and concerns among some traditional leaders that the new members would lead the party away from its roots.

At one level, this tension between PAN traditionalists, many of whom were children and grandchildren of party founders and early militants, and the new adherents, sometimes called *neopanistas*, was about ideology: *neopanistas* brought a new enthusiasm for the free market,

whereas the party had moved in a more Catholic reformist direction in the 1960s and 1970s. More profoundly, however, the tension concerned the relationship of strategy and ideology. *Neopanistas* elevated the goals of winning elections and ousting the PRI from power over any particular focus on ideology, to the dismay of PAN traditionalists, for whom the party's educational mission held as much salience as taking the reins of government (Mizrahi 2003; Shirk 2004). *Neopanistas* preferred a catch-all party to a confessional party.

Since the early 1980s, PAN campaigns for local office have tended to stress that PAN candidates will bring honest and competent government to cities and states that have suffered under PRI corruption, cronyism, and mismanagement (Rodríguez and Ward 1992). In places the PAN has now governed, especially in the north and center-west, state and local politics takes an "ins versus outs" (PAN versus PRI) quality, which reinforces two-party competition. Indeed, recognizing that it could promote an image as an alternative government to that offered by the PRI, from the early 1990s on the PAN consciously followed a "creeping federalist" strategy, seeking first to win local and state-level elections and thereby to build its support base incrementally (Lujambio 1995; Mizrahi 2003; Shirk 2004). This strategy contrasts with the more confrontational, national-level approach followed by the PRD before 1997.

The PAN has seen internal divisions develop as it evolved from an organization strictly on the outside with little hope of taking office to one that has governed in several states and many localities, whose members of Congress have votes that really matter, and now whose standardbearer occupies the presidency. One internal current with which the PAN has wrestled is characterized by party members as the dilemma of how to make the transition from an opposition party to a governing party without losing the party's traditional identity (Mizrahi 1998, 110). This current, associated with former party president Felipe Calderón and the late Carlos Castillo Peraza (the PAN's 1997 candidate for regent of the Federal District) and strongly represented in the PAN's national party leadership organs, descends directly from many of the Social Christian Party leaders of the 1960s and 1970s. It places a relatively heavy emphasis on ideological clarity. Such party traditionalists have been very skeptical of those they consider "the barbarians of the north," Fox above all, because they worry that the political pragmatism of Fox and others like him will cause the party to place coming to power above all other considerations.

A catch-all party is not the traditionalists' vision of the PAN, but in the 1990s the party became exactly that. The cleavage in the electorate around the regime, the need to distinguish itself from a PRI that had come to share its perspective on socioeconomic development, and the success of the creeping federalist strategy have all pushed the PAN

toward a catch-all character. Yet traditionalists have sometimes won the party's nominations for important elected posts, such as Castillo Peraza's candidacy to govern Mexico City in 1997. Sensing that the traditionalists would seek to stymie his presidential ambitions, Fox created a parallel organization called Amigos de Fox, which helped to finance his campaign for the PAN nomination and effectively discouraged any other PAN leader from putting forward his name as an alternative. Seeing the need to be a real alternative to the PRI, Fox campaigned not as a loyal oppositionist but as an outsider seeking the change that could end the one-party regime. Recognizing that not all Mexicans orient themselves around the proregime-antiregime cleavage, Fox also touted his success as governor of Guanajuato. Policy differences between Fox and the PRI's Labastida did not become central to the campaign.

Reflecting its origins and the social bases of its electorate, the PAN remains both a Catholic and a business-oriented party. However, many of its leaders may be more to the right ideologically than its electorate (compare Martínez Rodríguez 1998; Moreno 1998; Bruhn 2004). Fox, though, is not, which may explain both the suspicion of him by party traditionalists and his victory in July 2000. Yet Fox's relationships with the party during his presidency have been strained. The candidate he and other *neopanistas* preferred for president of the party in 2002, Carlos Medina Plascencia, who advocated a more vigorous expansion of the party's base and greater advocacy of the Fox administration's policies, lost to the traditionalists' candidate, Luis Felipe Bravo Mena (Grayson 2002). The party's anemic performance in July 2003 owes much to its uncertain relationship with the president, a relationship that reflects a party torn between following the electoral incentives described in this study, as a catch-all party would, and remaining true to a set of principles that earlier had left the PAN largely as a responsible opposition.

The PRD

The PRD has been divided internally over ideological and strategic issues, as well as personal differences among leaders, since it was founded in 1989 (Valdés 1994; Bruhn 1997). Revolutionary nationalism motivates most PRD members, but most also recognize that economic nationalism and import-substituting industrialization will not bring Mexico economic development and would be nearly impossible to implement at this point. Yet the PRD has provided the most articulate critique of the neoliberal development strategy in the party system.

As a party fused from former socialist parties and former PRI members, seeking to recruit members and leaders of popular organizations to its fold, the PRD has incorporated a number of perspectives on

socioeconomic policy. In the late 1990s, two major contending currents in the party were a more social democratic wing, headed by Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (who left the party in 2000), which sought to attract a more middle-class constituency from among progressive PRI voters; and a more radical wing, then associated with Andrés Manuel López Obrador (currently Mexico City regent), which looked for support from "popular" sectors, the urban poor, workers, and peasants (Bruhn 1998).

After it failed to make significant gains against the PRI (as opposed to other parties of the left) nationally in the early 1990s (see table 1), the PRD made advances in the late 1990s by pursuing something akin to the PAN's creeping federalist strategy. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was elected mayor of Mexico City in 1997, which improved the PRD's image and signaled that the party could run a relatively nonideological campaign. After that, the party began to take advantage of tensions within the PRI at the state level. Several discouraged candidates for PRI gubernatorial nominations sought the support of independent coalitions that had the PRD at their center. Thus the PRD displaced the PRI from the governorships of Zacatecas and Tlaxcala in 1998 and Baja California Sur in 1999. In coalition with the PAN (but taking a greater role), the PRD won in Nayarit in 1999 and Chiapas in 2000, again nominating former PRI members as gubernatorial candidates. Finally, in the hard-fought gubernatorial race in Tabasco, a former PRI member running as the PRD's candidate lost a close election (twice) in 2000 and 2001.

Taking advantage of internal struggles in the PRI has little to do with ideological differences between the PRI and the PRD, but has served to create a type of two-party competition in several states where the PRI had previously ruled without challenge and the PAN had made minimal inroads. Still, this strategy of integrating failed PRI aspirants and their clientelistic networks into the PRD sometimes has created internal divisions that have caused the PRD to lose ground; for example, in Puebla and Veracruz in 1998 (Klesner 1999). In many parts of Mexico, especially the south, the PRD is composed largely of ex-PRI members and clienteles. Hence, while there are differences between the PRD and the other parties ideologically, again an "ins versus outs" divide has come to characterize these state and local-level struggles. Within the fractious PRD itself, political alliances revolve more around the contest for who will be the party's 2006 presidential candidate (Cárdenas or López Obrador) than around ideological or policy considerations (Grayson 2002; Crespo 2004).

Both the PAN's creeping federalist strategy and the PRD's willingness to take in frustrated PRI aspirants are efforts to capitalize on the regime-based cleavage at a local or state level. Thus they have created two-party-system dynamics (ins versus outs) in more localized settings. They have thereby permitted the two "opposition" parties to vie more effec-

tively for the ballots of the nonpartisans and new voters. These efforts have run much at variance with any effort to maintain ideological clarity. It comes as no surprise, then, to find that in comparative perspective, the ideological distances in the Mexican party system are quite narrow (Martínez Rodríguez 1998, 61). Moreover, in 2000, the PAN and the PRD presented party platforms at the national level that moved them closer to each other, while the PRI moved to the right of both (Bruhn 2004).

The PRI

For the PRI, ideology has long ceased to matter or to provide coherence. Indeed, although 40 years ago, scholars shoehorned Mexico into the democracy camp by discussing the divisions between left (followers of Lázaro Cárdenas) and right (Miguel Alemán's disciples) and postulating a pendulum theory of the presidency moving back and forth between them, others recognized that the most important operative principle in the PRI was the *camarrilla*, or political group, based on recruitment and personal loyalty rather than ideology (Johnson 1971; Smith 1979; Camp 1980). Furthermore, the PRI was never conceptualized as a party that would compete for power. Instead, as Lorenzo Meyer describes it,

> The PRI . . . was created to complement the institutional structure of the new regime, not to do battle with its political adversaries at the polls. It provides the forum for internal negotiations among the governing elite, for the distribution of political patronage awards, and for recruiting (fewer and fewer) and socializing new members. During electoral campaigns it acquaints the populace with its soon-to-be-elected officials, and it mobilizes specific sectors of society as needed for the preservation of the system. Between elections—excepting those occasions when government leadership needs limited mass mobilization—the official party practically disappears. Its activities are determined almost exclusively by the president and by the electoral calendar, not by grassroots interests or demands. (Meyer 1989, 335)

Real political power was centered in the presidency, the key political institution in Mexico (Brandenburg 1964; Garrido 1989). Increasingly, recruitment to the executive departments controlled by the presidency practically bypassed the party. However, electoral positions remained important as the patronage distributed by the party to sectoral groups whose votes the PRI counted on to produce electoral victories (Pacheco Méndez and Reyes del Campillo 1989).

For many years in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the PRI's most coherent argument for its rule had been that it was the party of the majority that could bring together "revolutionaries" of all sorts and thereby maintain the revolution in power. As such, the party was catch-

all in one sense—all who aspired to power could consider joining the PRI. The schism that produced the PRD was the first and largest example of aspiring PRI leaders taking the exit option when they found their promotion blocked by those above them—with whom they happened also to disagree on policy grounds.

When Zedillo chose not to take as active a role in the party after 1994, and especially after the PRI lost its control of the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, the party discipline that had been based on the combination of one-party rule and presidential domination of that party came unraveled. The party's ability to guarantee victory to its nominees disappeared. The president's capacity (and even willingness) to reward supporters with electoral victories similarly eroded. Thus, in a more competitive electoral environment with a president unwilling and in many ways unable to appoint electoral victors, who would designate PRI nominees to important elected positions, and how? What philosophy would hold together a party that had come to stand for little more than being in power and being experienced at governing?

Ideologically, the implementation of neoliberal economic policies under Salinas and Zedillo meant the abandonment of revolutionary nationalism by the party that had invented the ideology. In the aftermath of its historic defeat, some PRI leaders argued that the party had to pay greater attention to the social needs of those groups that had historically been the PRI's principal sources of votes—peasants and workers. Others, more closely associated with the party's technocratic wing, including the 2000 presidential nominee, Labastida, remained strong supporters of market-based economic policies. Since the party has moved into opposition, segments of the PRI have chosen to cooperate with Fox's legislative agenda or not, depending on whether they support or oppose neoliberal development strategies (Crespo 2004).

Without consensus on socioeconomic development strategy, the element of the PRI's doctrine that has come to the fore is its emphasis on law and order, political authority, and state power (Bruhn 2004). In 1994 the party manipulated the population's fear of disorder by suggesting that only its candidate and its team had the capacity to govern a society on the verge of chaos (as manifested by the Chiapas rebellion and other rural revolts and political assassinations in that year). In 2000, the PRI sought to play on that theme again, but without success. Again, this theme, which essentially can be summarized as the capacity to govern, can play well in a context in which electoral dynamics condense to ins versus outs.

Strategically, the PRI sought to resolve its internal struggles over nomination of candidates by introducing the party primary. So far, the party's experience with primaries has been mixed. In some cases at the state level, the use of party primaries has led to the selection of more

popular candidates for governor and success in the eventual general election. In others, denunciations of fraud have led to internal divisions (Klesner 1999). For the 2000 presidential election, the PRI's use of a primary to select its candidate may not have hurt the party (McCann 2004), but it clearly did not lead to the emergence of a winning candidate either. With the use of the open primary to choose its nominee, the PRI became a catch-all party in another sense: it more clearly sought to attract all voters.

The PRI always based its main appeal to voters on its capacity to govern. Its opponents, meanwhile, until the 1990s, did not effectively pose as alternative governors; they only offered alternative visions of Mexico. Offering alternative visions meant focusing on ideology and policy platforms. Arguing that one's party and candidates for executive office can govern better means emphasizing accomplishment and pragmatism. Despite their internal differences about policy and ideology, Mexico's three main parties now place the goal of appealing to voters on the grounds that they can most effectively govern above their more programmatic goals.

Conclusions

This article has argued that Mexico's parties, especially the former parties of opposition, have had specific social bases. These social bases, although a growing share of the Mexican population, would not on their own have catapulted either opposition party into the presidency. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the opposition parties, reflecting efforts by those parties to develop their organizations at the local and regional levels. Nationally, this led to the emergence of what looked like two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. From the mid-1980s on, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system. This split worked in partnership with opposition efforts to oust the PRI at the local and state levels to encourage the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences with the PRI and to act like catch-all parties instead.

The emergence of the proregime-antiregime cleavage has been fostered by the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process more profoundly evident among younger generations. Realignment of the electorate to specific parties has yet to occur. Dealignment also has promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without tension, but electoral dynamics prove very powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

During Mexico's protracted transition to democracy, this catch-all tendency and the local and regional focus has promoted the emergence

of a relatively stable and institutionalized party system, with three distinct and ideologically flexible parties competing nationally, even if only two are strongly represented in most states and localities. This outcome, although it benefits the stability of Mexico's new democracy, could hardly have been predicted or designed. In Latin America, the only other party system that has emerged recently from authoritarian rule with the same degree of stability is that of Chile, where the parties of the center-left have been pushed to form a relatively stable coalition as the result of their struggle to oust General Augusto Pinochet. Compared to the fragmentation and instability of the party systems of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, Mexicans may count their blessings to have three main parties that have competed for power since about 1990.

Mexico's party system looks profoundly different today than it did in 1985. Each party now has catch-all characteristics, and those party leaders or party nominees who have been most eclectic in campaign message and style have proved to be the most successful, with Vicente Fox serving as the archetype. The regime issue that reshaped Mexico's party system will, of course, subside. Eventually, the parties will have to reemphasize their ideological differences, especially if those parties that do not currently compete effectively in a municipality or district wish to break into an electoral arena now dominated by their two main adversaries. However, as the dynamics of two-party competition dictate, third parties will have difficulty breaking into new areas, which poses the main challenge to the PAN and the PRD in the coming years.

NOTES

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1. Mexico used the same districts from 1979 until 1994. A new apportionment was made for the 1997 elections and used in 2000 and 2003.

2. The electoral results used to calculate the number of parties therefore come from the federal deputy races, even in presidential years. In most past presidential election years, the parties' share of the votes in congressional elections has closely mirrored those in the presidential race.

3. The center-west is sometimes referred to as the Bajío, although the Bajío is only the heart of it. The regional distribution of the states used in this paper is as follows: North: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas. Center-West: Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Querétaro. Center: Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala. Mexico City area: Federal District, Estado de México. South: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán.

4. The only earlier study to use county-level data is Klesner 2004, in which the analysis stops at 1997. Mexico has more than 2,400 counties, or *municipios*, as they are called; several have been added in the past decade. They range from village-sized units of under 1,000 in Oaxaca to Guadalajara, with nearly 2 million. To accommodate these size variations in the multiple regression analysis, the cases have been weighted by size; specifically by an index created by dividing the number of registered voters (*lista nominal*) by the national mean for that list.

5. The choice of these five elections is based on data availability. The Mexican electoral authorities have never provided a full accounting of the results of the disputed 1988 election, nor have county-level results been released for other elections before 1991. Electoral results from 1991 to the present are available on the website of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). The data used to construct the explanatory variables in table 4 come from the website of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), specifically its Sistema Municipal de Bases de Datos (SIMBAD). The explanatory variables come from the 1990 census for the elections of 1991 and 1994 and from the 2000 census for the elections of 1997, 2000, and 2003.

6. Exit polls for the 2003 congressional election mirror the evidence provided in table 5. See *Reforma* 2003.

7. In 2003, when the PRD did much better compared to the PAN, the PRD outperformed the PAN in the southern states, according to *Reforma's* exit poll.

8. Mexico's principle of no reelection for any positions makes an anti-incumbent campaign somewhat different from what it would be in most other political systems. Here one must argue that the incumbent party's candidate is sufficiently like the outgoing officeholder of that party so that continuing a party in an executive office is like continuing an individual in that position in most other political systems. To the extent that individuals have been unwilling or unable to distinguish themselves from their copartisans, that anti-incumbent message can be successfully argued.

9. In practice, the question often varies slightly from this simple formulation, but modestly enough to make comparisons across time viable.

10. Because the 1997 ITAM survey was conducted after the election in which the PRI lost its majority in Congress, we might assume that the percentage of the respondents willing to express PRI partisanship may well have declined somewhat from where it was before the election.

11. The data in table 8 come from an exit poll, so voters would not have known the electoral results at the time they were surveyed. Consequently, a high incidence of changing one's partisanship so as to be on the winning side, a common problem in postelection polls, should not plague these data.

12. On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being extreme left and 10 extreme right, Mexicans placed themselves at about 6.5 during the 2000 campaign; they placed the PRI at about 6.8, the PAN at 5.8, and the PRD at 3.9 (these are the averages of the responses to the four waves of the Mexico 2000 Panel Study).

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