Mexicans are disenchanted with democracy—or at least with democracy in their country. A decade after the watershed 2000 presidential contest, they are already deeply distrustful of democratic institutions and actors, politicians, parties, and parliament. The contrast with the heady optimism of the 1990s could not be greater. Former President Ernesto Zedillo described the 1997 midterm elections, when the opposition wrested Congress from the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as a “democratic fiesta.” The phrase aptly characterizes the citizen effervescence of the entire decade. Now, the party’s over.

This rapid, deep disillusionment is especially puzzling because one would expect the euphoria following the culmination of Mexico’s transition to electoral democracy in 2000 to have been greater and more enduring than it has been. Decades of struggle for free and fair elections might have made citizens more forbearing of the shortcomings of the new government brought to power by these elections. Typically, democratic regimes’ legitimacy affords them a “reservoir of good will” that enables governments to withstand “performance deficits.” This reservoir, in theory, keeps citizens from generalizing their dissatisfaction with democratic governments to democracy as an ideal. Yet a mere nine years or less sufficed in Mexico for satisfaction with democracy to fall dramatically from its peak in 1997.

Why are Mexicans so dissatisfied with their democracy? The combination of a citizen conceptualization of democracy that emphasizes social equity—a “substantive” view of democracy—with poor government performance in just that respect is partly responsible. That is, even after accounting for other factors that bear on evaluations of democracy, how Mexicans define democracy exercises an important, independent effect on how satisfied they are with it. Specifically, citizens who view democracy as either political rights (“liberal” democrats) or elections (“electoral” democrats) are more satisfied than substantive democrats.

The causal relationship between conceptualizations of democracy and satisfaction with it is both undertheorized and underexplored empirically. Exploring definitions of democracy in three Latin American countries, Roderic Ai Camp has established that Mexicans tend to view democracy in socioeconomic terms, but he does not relate this
view to Mexicans’ evaluations of democratic performance. On the other hand, explanations of why citizens have soured on democratic politics in Latin America largely ignore the role that definitions of democracy play. Existing explanations draw from at least two theoretical strands: retroactive political and economic evaluations, and personal material and psychological resources. Thus, scholars have focused on regime performance and institutional trust, local government performance under decentralization, education and electoral competitiveness, and attitudinal holdovers from authoritarianism, among other causes. By tying together two threads of scholarship—definitions of democracy and satisfaction with it—this article shows that conceptions of democracy are an important, largely overlooked, ingredient in explaining disenchantment in Mexico and elsewhere.

The present study is based on a larger project in which I argue that declining satisfaction with democracy is cause for concern because it has an important impact on political behavior. In that project, I demonstrate that dissatisfaction with democracy affects the level of civic engagement and types of political participation in which Mexicans engage. Specifically, disenchantment leads to lower voter turnout, less civic engagement, and more legal and illegal protest. This article, however, concentrates specifically on conceptions of democracy as a main determinant of how satisfied one is with democracy.

It is not that disenchantment will lead to democratic breakdown in Mexico. Though it is no longer clear that Mexico is transitioning toward liberal democracy, neither has it lapsed back into frankly authoritarian rule—nor have other Latin American countries (except Honduras), despite acute economic and political crises in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Reversion to authoritarianism may owe more to elite polarization and strategic interaction than to feeble popular support for democracy.

Rather, Mexico appears to be stuck in a low-level equilibrium characterized by what Carothers has called “feckless pluralism.” Despite genuine electoral competition, political parties’ alternation in power has not done much for Mexico. Many citizens are deeply disaffected by politics, viewing political elites as venal and self-serving and civic involvement as futile. Disenchantment’s implications for political participation are important enough on their own to warrant study, even absent the specter of recrudescent authoritarianism.

Multivariate statistical techniques are used to auscultate the causes of disenchantment. Data are drawn from an original opinion survey, Desencanto Ciudadano en México, carried out by the Mexican polling firm Berumen y Asociados from June 16 to June 29, 2006—just before the general election. The survey was conducted face-to-face in 650 homes across the country; sixty-five electoral sections were selected at random, and ten individuals were chosen in each electoral section.

**Conceptions of Democracy and Disenchantment: The Theory**

Satisfaction with democracy has fallen precipitously in Mexico. According to Latino-barometer data, the proportion of Mexican citizens who are “somewhat” or “very” satisfied with democracy dropped from a high of 45 percent in 1997 to around 17 percent
in 2003 to 2005. Figure 1 provides data taken from three data series from 1997 to 2008, all of which trend downward.

**Figure 1**  Percentage of Mexicans Who Report Themselves as “Very” or “Fairly Satisfied with Democracy in Mexico” (1997–2008)

Even the high points of Mexican satisfaction with democracy have been ephemeral. Satisfaction appears to follow electoral cycles, peaking during the 1997 midterm election and the 2000 presidential contest, only to decrease after the election-induced elation wore off. The pattern is interrupted in 2003, when midterm elections were incapable of elevating satisfaction—a testament to how rapidly disillusionment set in after the wave of citizen exhilaration swept Vicente Fox into power in 2000. The apparent 2006 recovery (41 percent recorded by the Latinobarometer, seconded by *Desencanto Ciudadano’s* 39 percent) proved illusory. A heated presidential race focused attention on what had been Mexican democracy’s crowning achievement: free and fair elections. But Mexicans’ enthusiasm plummeted after the election, with half of Mexicans believing it was plagued by irregularities, and the vast majority calling the country “undemocratic.” Satisfaction fell to 31 percent in 2007 and sunk even further to 23 percent in 2008.

**Democracy and Satisfaction**

Focusing on a single moment in time (June 2006) indicates that a main cause of disenchantment with democracy in Mexico is a substantive definition of democracy as economic growth tied to more a more equitable distribution of its benefits—“upward convergence”—which Mexican democracy has manifestly failed to deliver. Those who see democracy as a collection of rights are somewhat more satisfied, and those who emphasize elections, still more. The way in which citizens conceptualize democracy—their
choice of which of its constituent values to emphasize in their mental construct of
democracy—entails a vision about what life in a democratic society should be like.
In other words, definitions of democracy imply expectations about political, social, and
economic outcomes. The ideological content citizens invest in the concept of democracy
will result in greater satisfaction with democracy when these expectations are concordant
with reality. When citizens perceive a gap between what they want from democracy and
what they are actually getting, they may conclude that democracy is not working in their
country—and, in the extreme, that democracy may not be a form of government suited
for their society.

This is true in both developed and developing democracies. In their study of public
conceptions of democracy in Canada, Allan Kornberg and Harold Clarke argue that con-
gruence between “beliefs about democracy” and “the realities of political life in their
country” result in favorable evaluations of democracy’s functioning.13 Identifying four
broad dimensions along which Canadians array their beliefs about democracy, the
authors find that those who viewed democracy as equality between social groups were
most satisfied, given Canada’s multicultural character. On the other hand, Canadians
hewing to a minimalist definition of democracy as elections coupled with capitalism
were least satisfied, given the country’s redistributive bent.

More relevant to the Mexican case, perhaps, are views of democracy in emerging
democratic polities. Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger’s study of con-
ceptions of democracy in Russia and Ukraine demonstrates the effects of citizen con-
ceptions of democracy on appraisals of it.14 Russians and Ukrainians who conceived of
democracy as a set of freedoms had better-than-average evaluations of regime perfor-
mance in their respective countries. In contrast, citizens who emphasized the rule of law
had worse-than-average evaluations of the current regimes, as did those who expected
democracy would increase economic prosperity. Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger explain the
relationship between views of democracy and support for democratization as a function of
the perceived fit between citizen ideals and government execution of those ideals: “[I]f
[citizens] believe that the present regime is not fulfilling their expectations of [their] ideal
of democracy, then they will be less supportive of current attempts at democratization.”15

These cases illustrate the general proposition that how citizens conceive of democ-

Hypotheses

In Mexico electoral democrats should be most satisfied with democracy, followed by
liberal and then substantive democrats. The reasons for this ordering lie in varying levels
of recent government performance in conducting elections, respecting rights, and fostering economic development. The three federal elections prior to 2006 were largely clean and (with the exception of 2003) marked by high citizen participation, an indication that the public accorded broad legitimacy to the democratic regime.\textsuperscript{16} In the states and municipalities, highly competitive elections made political geography a veritable mosaic of parties controlling different branches and levels of government.

On the other hand, governmental respect for individual liberties and rights presented a mixed panorama during President Fox’s \textit{sexenio}. The bright spots were transparency, including the passage of a freedom of information act, and horizontal accountability between the executive and legislative branches. However, rampant human rights abuses (especially at the subnational level), weak rule of law, continuing corruption, impunity of the powerful, and waning freedom of the press counteracted gains on other fronts.\textsuperscript{17}

Economic performance fared worst of all. Though Fox’s fiscal and monetary orthodoxy kept a lid on inflation, it failed to ameliorate the problems Mexicans identify as the most urgent—jobs and poverty. The informal sector grew, real wages declined, and the unemployed and underemployed saw their ranks swell from 7.4 to 9.7 percent during Fox’s term—a situation that undoubtedly would have been worse if not for the safety valve of massive emigration. Poverty remained high with 40 to 50 percent (depending on the measure used) of the population living below the poverty line. Finally, GDP growth averaged an anemic 2.3 percent from 2001–2006, far below the 7 percent Fox himself had promised on the campaign trail. In short, elections fared well, observance of democratic rights and liberties varied, and economic performance failed to redress—and in some cases worsened—longstanding problems.

\textbf{Satisfaction with Democracy: The Dependent Variable}

\textbf{The Conceptual Debate over Satisfaction}  
What does it mean to say that one is satisfied with democracy? Democracy comprises many elements, including incumbent politicians, policy outputs, government institutions, and normative principles. Political psychologists have arrayed these “attitudinal objects” along a scale of abstractness.\textsuperscript{18} At one end lie the most immediate, concrete objects—people (“incumbents”) and policies (“outputs”). At the other extreme is the most intangible object, the “political community” or country. The bounds of the continuum correspond roughly to the Eastonian concepts of “specific” and “diffuse” support.

When survey interviewees are asked to evaluate democracy, which of these political objects are they being asked to offer an opinion about? What do people have in mind when they think about democracy, the political system as a whole, or some particular part of it? Citizens have attitudes, but about what?

Attempts to answer this question have generated considerable debate. Some have argued that the typical satisfaction question—“How satisfied are you with democracy in [your country]?”—refers to incumbent authorities and policy outputs;\textsuperscript{19} others, that
it is an indicator of mid-level “system support” somewhere between incumbents and democracy as an ideal, and still others, that it is a “summary indicator” of overall satisfaction embracing the gamut of political objects. At the extreme, three scholars have averred that the “satisfaction with democracy” survey item is essentially meaningless. Damarys Canache, Jeffrey Mondak, and Mitchell Seligson argue that its polysemy—different meanings to individual survey respondents—renders it invalid for use in comparative research.

“Deepening” the Satisfaction Indicator  Though Canache, Mondak, and Seligson’s analysis is problematic, their larger point about the risks inherent in using single-item indicators for satisfaction with democracy is well taken. Slippage between signifier and signified—the possibility that a survey question may not measure what it purports to—is bound to be greater when a concept is expressed in a single formulation. Combining two survey questions into a general, holistic evaluation of democracy in Mexico provides greater conceptual depth: “In general, how satisfied are you with democracy in Mexico?” and “In your opinion, how democratic is Mexico?” In the survey data presented here, these items are combined into a single, additive eight-point scale.

Fusing the two questions into a single indicator of satisfaction is justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, a judgment about how democracy is faring in Mexico presupposes a belief about the degree of democracy the country has achieved. It is impossible, for example, to imagine a set of circumstances in which someone could be “very” satisfied with democracy yet believe that the country is “not at all” democratic. Citizens are dissatisfied with democracy in Mexico precisely because they feel Mexico is less democratic than it should be.

The numbers bear out this intuition. Table 1 is a cross-classification of these two survey items, with the observed cell counts followed by cell expected under the independence hypothesis in parentheses. If these two variables are conceptually close, one would expect a high concentration of cell counts along the faux “diagonal” (including cells {2,3} and {3,4}), with observed cell counts below expected values moving away from the diagonal. This is roughly what is observed. Indeed, there are no respondents who described Mexico as undemocratic yet reported being “very” satisfied with democracy. Measures of association also show a high degree of correspondence between the two variables (Gamma = .424, Spearman’s rho = .337, r = .335). In sum, the two items fit together well not only logically but also empirically.

Conceptions of Democracy: The Independent Variables

How do Mexicans conceive of democracy? In Mexico, as elsewhere, there is no single answer to this question. Political theorists differ among themselves on the definition of democracy, and so do Mexicans. Three broad democratic orientations can be identified. Liberal democracy is rooted in post-independence, nineteenth century liberalism and conceives of democracy as a collection of rights and liberties associated
with citizenship—freedom of belief, expression, and association, equality before the law, property rights, pluralism, and others. Electoral democracy posits that democracy is primarily a mechanism by which to choose decision makers. This definition acquired greater currency as Mexican elections progressed from fraud-plagued exercises in authoritarian regime legitimization to genuine choices between competing candidates. Finally, substantive democracy, a firmly entrenched view incarnated in the 1917 Constitution, equates democracy with economic improvement that advances social justice.

**Defining Democracy: From Elections to Economic Equality**  
The debate over what democracy actually is, over the conditions necessary for a country to be considered democratic, has produced a bewildering variety of definitions and considerable controversy among both professional political philosophers and thoughtful ordinary citizens. Stated schematically, these definitions can be grouped into three broad categories—electoral, liberal, and substantive democracy.

Electoralism defines democracy simply as, in Schumpeter’s well-known formulation, an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”

Because of its emphasis on the laws and institutions that govern competition, this variety of democracy has been referred to (sometimes disdainfully by advocates of substantive democracy) as “formal” or “procedural” democracy. Electoral democracy has also been tagged “minimalist,” since it constricts democracy’s ambit to political authority, explicitly excluding social and economic considerations.

However, for electoral competition to be real countries must guarantee minimal rights (to express ideas and organize parties, for example) without which elections are a hollow shell, devoid of democratic content. Philipp Schmitter and Terry Karl dubbed the idea that elections alone make for a democracy the “fallacy of electoralism.” This conceptual “precising,” or “expanded procedural” definition of democracy, leads into the terrain of liberal democracy. The essence of liberal democracy inheres in the name itself—liberty, especially vis-à-vis government action. It values pluralism; freedom of

**Table 1** Cross Classification of Level of Democracy with Satisfaction of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How democratic is Mexico?</th>
<th>Not at All</th>
<th>Not Very</th>
<th>Neither/Nor</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at All</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20 (6.9)</td>
<td>12 (10.1)</td>
<td>7 (7.1)</td>
<td>1 (13.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>53 (42.3)</td>
<td>79 (62.3)</td>
<td>45 (43.6)</td>
<td>58 (85.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>23 (47.1)</td>
<td>52 (69.3)</td>
<td>50 (48.5)</td>
<td>139 (95.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6 (5.7)</td>
<td>7 (8.3)</td>
<td>3 (5.8)</td>
<td>8 (11.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Observed cell counts with counts expected under independence in parentheses.
expression, association, and transaction; and tolerance of dissent. It entails constraints on political power, horizontal accountability between branches of government, and vertical accountability between leaders and citizens. Accountability, in turn, requires the free circulation of information and ideas. Thus, liberal democracy is a set of rights that, in theory, protect citizens against abuse of state power.

Substantive democracy rests on the foundation of what T. H. Marshall called “social citizenship,” the right of all citizens to share in the benefits of society. Participating in society requires a minimal material platform of economic security and well being. Thus, substantive democracy expands the panoply of rights to include education, health, work, and so on, creating a corresponding general obligation of the state (or, more precisely, the welfare state) to provide these goods to citizens who are unable to do so for themselves.

Many thinkers, including Guillermo O’Donnell, have explicitly embraced an expanded version of democracy based on social citizenship as necessary for Latin America. They reject the notion that elections are sufficient for democracy since “imbalance in resources and political power frequently undermine the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle, and the purpose of democratic institutions.” The late Mexican political theorist Carlos Pereyra observed that “an ineradicable socioeconomic inequality . . . underlies the supposed legal-political equality of citizens,” rendering delusive the idea of equality before the law when social imbalances are grave.

Of course, these views of democracy are not mutually exclusive. To be sure, there are important differences between the perspectives. For example, fearing that universal suffrage would jeopardize property rights, classical liberalism opposed extension of the franchise. Liberalism’s concept of negative rights—limits on the power of government to legislate away individual freedoms—frequently enters into tension with electoralism’s cardinal principle of majority rule. Moreover, liberal democracy is laissez faire whereas substantive democracy favors regulatory and redistributive government intervention in the economy.

But the concepts also overlap to a great degree. Substantive democrats may frequently see electoral and civic participation as a way to achieve economic rights, as when working class political parties arose in Europe and elsewhere in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Certainly, many substantive democrats embrace the rights contained in liberalism, even accepting private property in principle (though with more state regulation than a classical liberal would tolerate).

Thus, elements of each view may figure to varying degrees in each citizen’s idea of democracy. Concepts of democracy are a question of emphasis. Some aspects of democracy are more salient than others in individual images of democracy, and this mix varies from person to person. Which concepts stand out to which people is important because how one views democracy is critical for how one evaluates it.

The Idea of Democracy in Mexico Each of these three basic orientations toward democracy—liberal, electoral, and substantive (now in order of historical appearance)—has deep roots in Mexican history. Liberal ideas were present in the foundational documents
emanating from Mexico’s War of Independence from Spain (1810–1821), including the 1824 Constitution. These texts established the principles of federalism, freedom of the press, pluralism, property rights, equality before the law, and secularism. The liberal 1857 Constitution enshrined separation of church and state.

Two periods of electoralism may be distinguished. The first began with Francisco I. Madero’s 1908 panegyric to electoral democracy, La sucesión presidencial en 1910, which reinterpreted the nineteenth century and cast as heroes those who had laid aside personal ambitions in deference to the will of the people. The second transpired in the 1990s, when opposition parties’ and citizens’ clamor for competitive elections culminated in a major 1996 reform.

Finally, the 1917 Constitution’s social charter enunciated principles of substantive democracy, including workers’ rights and land reform. A 1946 constitutional reform to Article 3 encapsulates the essence of substantive democracy as “not only a legal structure and political regime, but also a system of life founded on a constant economic, social, and cultural betterment of the people.” This idea would come to dominate Mexicans’ views of democracy.

The liberal, electoral, and substantive concepts of democracy exist not only as ideas in Mexican social and intellectual history but also as attitudes toward democracy in Mexico’s citizens of today. Each of these ideas of democracy filtered down from the political elites who expounded them to the mass public through, among other channels, the powerful socializing force of compulsory public education.

The Desencanto Ciudadano survey included a twelve-item battery of questions designed to explore citizens’ conceptualizations of democracy more thoroughly than any existing survey. Each concept of democracy was articulated by a set of four items (see Appendix A) combined into separate attitudinal scales (ranging from zero to sixteen) by summing the scores for the four items representing each conception. The four items that make up the liberal democracy scale measure support for religious tolerance, freedom of expression and association, political pluralism, and private property. The electoral democracy items inquire about whether respondents saw electoral competition and majority rule as conditions sufficient for democracy (or at least the main ingredients) and whether elections or protest are more effective for achieving change. Finally, the substantive democracy battery asks if, in addition to political equality, democracy implies greater economic equality, and if democracy and capitalism necessarily go together.

To ascertain how prevalent each view is in Mexico, respondents are classified as liberal, electoral, or substantive democrats according to the scale on which they scored highest. Figure 2 represents the distribution of these concepts of democracy in Mexico. Substantive democrats predominate, constituting nearly 30 percent of the population. This is consistent with Camp’s finding that equality is the modal definition of democracy in Mexico. Electoral democrats follow at 26 percent, with liberal democrats at just below 22 percent.

However, citizens may hold each idea of democracy to varying degrees. Thus, conceptions of democracy figure not as dummy variables in which citizens are classified
as a single type of democrat, but as continuous indices that, taken together, reflect each citizen’s mix of views.

To ensure that the liberal, electoral, and substantive constructs represent analytically distinguishable conceptual dimensions of democracy, I examined bivariate correlations for each of the three pairs of constructs. The correlations between electoral and substantive democracy, and electoral and liberal democracy, are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The correlation between liberal and substantive democracy is statistically significant, but small at $r = .08$. These views of democracy are, indeed, distinct from one another.

Where do they come from? Though a comprehensive account of their origins is beyond the scope of this study, education and partisanship play important roles. Regressing the attitude scales on socioeconomic and party identification variables shows that those with graduate educations are 1.8 points higher on the liberal democracy scale than those with no education (a movement of 12 percent over the dependent variable’s range). However, no other sociodemographic variable affects how citizens define democracy. Thus, substantive democrats are not just the losers under neoliberalism, nor are electoral democrats drawn primarily from the upper crust. Rather than deriving from socioeconomic conditions, views of democracy appear to be transmitted socially. Political parties are a primary vehicle of socialization. Sympathizers of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) are much likelier to be substantive democrats ($\beta = .716$, $p = .024$) as well as liberal democrats ($\beta = .588$, $p = .063$) and panistas, electoral democrats ($\beta = .622$, $p = .032$).
Other Explanations: Retrospective Evaluations and Personal Resources

Although conceptions of democracy are important influences on satisfaction, they are not the only ones. At least two other theoretical currents have been marshaled to explain levels of satisfaction with democracy: retrospective evaluations and personal resources.\(^{37}\) Conceptions of democracy are crucial for explaining satisfaction with democracy, but they complement (rather than replace) existing explanations. Variables embodying these two schools of thought are incorporated into the model to ensure that the effects of conceptions of democracy on satisfaction are not confounded with other possible causes.

**Retrospective Evaluations**  A robust line of research establishes that citizen evaluations of past regime economic and political performance, as well as evaluations of politicians and the policies they make, condition satisfaction with democracy.\(^{38}\) Performance comprises many dimensions, including economic policy, political development, provision of services, and approval of incumbent politicians. Positive judgments in each of these areas carry over to democracy considered in the abstract, whereas negative evaluations may cause citizens to question democracy as a form of government.

Citizens’ judgments about government’s handling of the economy affect satisfaction with democracy.\(^{39}\) Positing a relationship between economic assessments and satisfaction assumes that citizens attribute economic performance to government policy, at least to some extent. Adopting the distinction between “pocketbook” and “sociotropic” judgments about economic performance, the *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey made this assumption explicit. It asked respondents whether “government economic decisions” have been “good for the country” and “good for me personally.” Since these two items were highly correlated (\(r = .77\)), they are combined them in an additive, nine-point scale.

Of course, citizens in new democracies expect things other than relative economic improvement from their governments. They also insist that governments uphold hard-won rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and belief, and deal with citizens equitably, enforcing the rule of law regardless of social position and political connections. The *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey asked respondents to agree or disagree (on a five-point scale) with the statements, “The federal government respects people’s rights,” and “The state government respects people’s rights.” These two items were also highly correlated (\(r = .69\)), and again the responses are summed into a single, nine-point scale.

Another aspect of political performance, especially in new democracies, is the government’s ability to hold free and fair elections. Assessing evidence from over thirty countries, Alisa Henderson found high bivariate associations between “satisfaction with democracy” and the “conduct of the previous election.”\(^{40}\) Similarly, Kornberg and Clarke found that “electoral process evaluations” were significant determinants of satisfaction with democracy in Canada.\(^{41}\) Given the weighty history of election fraud in Mexico, evaluations of electoral processes should figure prominently in assessments of how Mexican democracy is performing. Thus, the *Desencanto Ciudadano* asked respondents to agree or disagree (on a five-point scale) with the statements that the
“past federal elections” and the “past state elections were clean.” Again, a high correlation ($r = .71$) suggested summing the items into a single measure.

Most Mexicans also expect their government to provide basic services and infrastructure, including roads, schools, and electricity. These demands are not specifically democratic, but citizens in a democratic society are, in theory, better able than subjects of authoritarian rule to influence the provision and distribution of public goods. Thus, evaluations of services may constitute a de facto indicator of how responsive citizens perceive their politicians to be. The survey included four items on government services, asking citizens to rate provision of water and electricity, public education, and police performance on a scale of one to seven.

In new democracies in particular, institutional roles such as president or legislator may be virtually indistinguishable from the “incumbents of those roles,” in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s language.42 This is especially so in Mexico, where the experience of electoral democracy was virtually synonymous with the colorful, plain-talking Vicente Fox. Furthermore, a historically powerful presidency has focused political discussion on the president’s (and state and local chief executives’) personality and actions. The Desencanto Ciudadano elicited performance ratings of the president, governor, and mayor on a seven-point scale. Another item inquired about satisfaction with Congress. This question probably reflects a general evaluation of the legislature as a whole rather than opinions about incumbent legislators as most Mexicans do not know their diputado’s name.

**Personal Resources** A second theoretical current holds that individuals’ material circumstances, cognitive abilities, and psychological dispositions—their “personal resources”—affect satisfaction with democracy. Almond and Verba, Philip Converse, and others emphasize “citizen competency,” the ability and inclination to participate politically, as an important determinant of attitudes and behavior.43 More politically efficacious citizens should be more satisfied with democracy. Furthermore, emotional identification with the political system and its components—particularly parties—also bolsters satisfaction.

Income is a material resource that shapes one’s ability to influence public decisions and fosters a sense of connection to the political system. Higher earners may be more satisfied with life generally; they may also conclude that democracy is working well for them, and so should exhibit greater political satisfaction. In addition, money increases the specifically political resources that citizens have at their disposal. It gives them (potentially) greater access to government institutions and more information about government activities.

Similarly, more education should also raise evaluations of democracy. Higher education levels give rise to a middle class that ameliorates redistributive battles, favoring the growth of democracy.44 Education also gives citizens the cognitive skills—“internal efficacy” or “citizen competency”—that enable them to participate meaningfully in politics.45

As a proxy for experience and wisdom, age is another resource that might influence satisfaction with democracy. In new democracies, older survey respondents may be
more satisfied since they have direct memories of authoritarianism. They are also likelier to have more stable incomes and social positions. On the other hand, youth are notorious detractors of politics.

Finally, men may be more satisfied with democracy than women. Roderic Ai Camp and Keith Yanner observe a “gender gap” in satisfaction with democracy in Mexico. Gender is a personal resource in at least two senses. First, it conditions access to political networks. Despite recent relative gains by women in parliamentary representation and cabinet appointments, politics in Mexico continues to be mostly a boy’s game. Second, gender shapes how men and women think about politics. Adherence to traditional gender roles in Mexico means the public sphere is thought of as the province of men, whereas the domestic ambit is “feminized.” Even where women are active in leading social movements and civic organizations, they may not see this participation as especially political.

Attitudes toward specific components of the political system also influence satisfaction with democracy as a whole. Specifically, scholars have signaled militancy in or affective affinity with a political party as important in contributing to satisfaction with democracy. Democratic elections produce winners and losers, and “people who voted for a governing party...are almost by definition more likely to believe that the government is interested in and responsive to their needs.” In Mexico the ruling National Action Party (PAN) has been the biggest beneficiary of the transition to electoral democracy, and panistas should exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy.

Modeling Satisfaction

A simple linear model of the relationship between concepts of democracy (and other explanatory variables) and satisfaction is:

$$ SAT = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ELE + \beta_2 LIB + \beta_3 SUB + X'_{SAT} \gamma_{SAT} + u, $$

where SAT = Level of Satisfaction with Democracy; ELE, LIB, and SUB are the electoral, liberal, and substantive conceptions of democracy; the vector $X'_{SAT}$ contains other determinants of satisfaction; the $\beta$’s and the elements of the vector $\gamma_{SAT}$ associated with $X'_{SAT}$ are parameters to be estimated; and $u$ is a disturbance. The hypotheses are: $\beta_1 > 0$, $\beta_3 < 0$, and $\beta_1 > \beta_2 > \beta_3$.

Conceptions of Democracy and Disenchantment: Evidence from the Mexican Case

Table 2 presents coefficient estimates from a hierarchical linear (HLM) regression of the “thickened” satisfaction with democracy index on citizen conceptions of democracy and the other explanatory variables. The results confirm that, even after considering the effects from other determinants of satisfaction with democracy, conceptions of democracy exercise an important, independent effect on satisfaction.
The rank order of conceptions of democracy vis-à-vis satisfaction conforms to the hypotheses. Electoral democrats are most satisfied with democracy, followed by liberal democrats. Substantive democrats are least satisfied. The parameter estimates are .069 for the electoral democracy scale, −.024 for the liberal scale, and −.055 for the substantive scale. The electoral democracy estimate is clearly higher than those for liberal and, a fortiori, substantive democracy. If the electoral and liberal democracy parameters had the same value, the probability of observing the difference produced by the model (.093) is \( p = .036 \) under the classic t-test. Similarly, the t-test for differences between the electoral and substantive democracy parameters (.124) yields \( p = .004 \). (The estimates for substantive and liberal democracy are statistically indistinguishable: \( p = .470 \).)
Not only do the effects of definitions of democracy differ from one another statistically, they also have substantively important effects on satisfaction. The substantive view of democracy decreases satisfaction notably. Respondents at the minimum of the substantive scale (0) have an average satisfaction score .88 points lower than those at the maximum (16), a difference of over 12.5 percent of the satisfaction scale’s range.

The electoral view of democracy’s effect is even stronger, but in the opposite direction—it increases satisfaction. Respondents at the maximum of the electoral scale have an average satisfaction score over 1.1 points higher than those at the minimum—a difference of 15.8 percent over the dependent variable’s range. For its part, liberal democracy has no appreciable impact on satisfaction.

Conceptions of democracy influence satisfaction independently of the other independent variables—the retrospective evaluations and personal resources controlled for in the model. But many of these also had important implications for satisfaction with democracy. Of the retrospective evaluations, a favorable perception of government economic policy increases satisfaction the most, with a coefficient of .187. Those with the highest possible evaluation of economic policy score, on average, 1.5 points higher than those with the lowest possible evaluation—a difference that represents nearly 21.4 percent of the satisfaction range.

Government political performance also shapes satisfaction, though less so than economic performance. The belief that government respects citizen rights increases satisfaction with democracy ($\beta = .114$). Those at the maximum of the rights scale scored, on average, .9 points higher on the satisfaction scale (13 percent of its range) than those at the minimum. Positive perceptions of electoral conduct also elevate satisfaction ($\beta = .067$). The average difference between respondents at the minimum and maximum of the fair elections scale, just over a half point, represents about 7.7 percent of satisfaction scale’s range.

Approval of Congress also boosts satisfaction. Disapproval of Congress is widespread. In the Desencanto Ciudadano survey, Congress garnered average approval of just 3.8 (on a scale of 1 to 7). Citizens who give Congress high marks see a vitalized legislature as a novel, salutary element in Mexican democracy, whereas most view Congress as an obstacle to governance. The average difference in satisfaction between respondents at the maximum and minimum of the approval scale is over .8 points—almost 12 percent of the satisfaction range.

Of the personal resource control variables, partisanship had the greatest impact on satisfaction. Specifically, sympathizers of both the ruling PAN and the PRD were most satisfied with democracy. For PAN sympathizers, democracy was virtually synonymous with that party’s ascent to the presidency in 2000. Camp has shown that Mexicans who voted for Fox in 2000 were more satisfied with democracy in Mexico and believe that Mexico is, indeed, a democracy.50 Similarly, the 2006 Panel Survey revealed that Calderón voters are more satisfied with democracy and likelier to believe that Mexico is a democracy.51 PAN sympathizers’ satisfaction may have also been prospective. Their candidate was surging in the polls after having trailed the PRD candidate for two years. PAN sympathizers were, on average, nearly 0.6 points higher on the satisfaction scale (8.2 percent of the range) than other citizens.
If PAN supporters are satisfied with democracy primarily because they have won, PRD supporters were satisfied with democracy in June 2006 because it appeared that they would win. PRD partisanship caused a rise of .54 points on the satisfaction scale (7.7 percent of the range) But party-based evaluations of democracy are sensitive to electoral outcomes. After the controversial July 2006 election, PRD supporters were less likely than others to call Mexico a democracy.52

Other variables failed to influence satisfaction with democracy. Contrary to what I hypothesized, Mexicans’ evaluations of federal, state, and municipal chief executives had no bearing on their evaluations of democracy. This result is surprising given the country’s hierarchical, personality-driven caudillismo and “hyper-presidentialism.” However, some have interpreted Fox’s high presidential approval ratings as more a reflection of his personal popularity than an evaluation of his job performance. In any event, the diminished role of the president in shaping satisfaction—and the heightened role of Congress—mirrors a shift in the balance of power between the executive and legislative powers.

Similarly, opinions of basic government services (water, electricity, education, and public security) bore no relation to satisfaction with democracy. Although provision of public goods is a crucial component of governance, Mexicans may dissociate the supply of these goods from specifically democratic governance. After all, authoritarianism under the PRI built the country’s material infrastructure well. Mexicans’ expectations of democracy appear to go beyond getting services, especially ones they already have. How well the government furnishes these has little to do with how citizens evaluate democracy.

Finally, socioeconomic and demographic circumstances had no bearing on satisfaction with democracy. Men are not more satisfied than women. Older citizens are not more satisfied than younger ones, nor the well off more than the less affluent, nor the better educated more than the less educated. Perhaps social position influences satisfaction indirectly through attitudes—social conditions shape political and economic evaluations, which in turn affect satisfaction. The effect of social conditions would be absorbed by attitudinal variables.

Conclusion

How Mexicans define democracy and what they expect of it are important causes of satisfaction with democracy. Specifically, substantive democrats’ emphasis on socio-economic equity makes them significantly less satisfied with democracy than liberal democrats, who emphasize rights, and electoral democrats, who underscore procedures.

Substantive democrats’ greater disillusionment with democracy could have far-reaching implications—both for Mexico and other new democracies. Mexicans’ political dissatisfaction is deep seated and widespread. Moreover, substantive definitions of democracy may be intensifying dissatisfaction elsewhere in the world.

Disenchantment with democracy in Mexico goes well beyond disapproval of incumbents, unhappiness with services, and belonging to a party other than that in power. The most important determinant, economic malaise, seems to be a long-term
judgment in precisely the area where Mexican democracy has performed worst. More worrisome, those who expect democracy to deliver economic progress are those who are least satisfied with it. This bespeaks long-lasting mismatch between what citizens need and what Mexican democracy is delivering. Of course, all Mexicans’ attitudes toward democracy are colored by economic performance. But substantive democrats’ dissatisfaction is on top of their economic evaluations. That is, economic expectations compound the effects of poor economic performance. And the substantive view of democracy is the most prevalent in Mexico. In short, general dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico is rooted in causes that seem to be relatively enduring.

The Mexican case may hold lessons for other countries. Mexico’s political attitudes and level of economic development make it typical of developing democracies. Citizens of these democracies may have a predominantly substantive view of democracy and expect government to better their lots in life. Studies of Latin America and post-Soviet countries suggest that this is the case. Heightened socioeconomic expectations of democracy may be contributing to disenchantment elsewhere in the world.

Some would lay the blame at citizens’ feet for their unrealistic expectations of democracy. Yet in societies where poverty and inequality result from powerful economic interests’ grip on political decision making, it is perhaps reasonable—and, in any event, unavoidable—to expect that democracy redound in greater socioeconomic equality. As Camp writes, “It is logical to believe that among the political models in which the population has significant voice in making decisions, the people across the board obtain a larger share of the societal resources.”53 When citizens fail to get their share of the pie, they conclude that democracy is not working or that their country is not very democratic.

Why should dissatisfaction worry us, though? Although it may have contributed to democratic breakdown in some cases (Russia, for example), more troublesome in Mexico and most countries are its behavioral consequences. As I argue elsewhere, disenchantment has a deep impact on political participation, dampening voting and non-contentious civic engagement while stimulating protest that strains fragile institutions, in Huntington’s view,54 or, from another perspective, challenges dysfunctional institutions. Disaffection erodes the quality of democracy by dissipating already tenuous linkages of representation between politicians and citizens, making solution of pressing social problems more remote. The generals may not be in the statehouse, but many citizens remain in the poorhouse and democracy, in the doghouse.

Appendix: Battery of Survey Items on Conceptions of Democracy

**Liberal Democracy**

Now I’m going to read a sentence about democracy and I would like you to tell me if you agree very much, somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree very much:

- A democratic government’s public policies should reflect the majority’s religious values.
- In a democracy, gays and lesbians have the right to organize public marches.
Now I’m going to read two sentences. I would like you to tell me if you agree with the first very much, agree with the first more than the second, are in the middle, agree with the second more than the first, or agree with the second very much.

- “It’s better for the President’s party to have a majority in Congress so that laws don’t get held up” or, “It’s better to have many parties in Congress so there is more debate.”
- Suppose that the government wants to build a social service center. The only feasible place is located on private property, but the owner is against it. The government should lean toward 1) respecting private property or 2) putting the public interest first and taking the land.

**Electoral Democracy**

Now I’m going to read a sentence about democracy and I would like you to tell me if you agree very much, somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree very much:

- More than anything else, democracy means selecting political leaders in free and fair elections.
- Free elections alone don’t make a country democratic.
- More than anything, democracy is that parties compete for the majority’s support.

Now I’m going to read two sentences. I would like you to tell me if you agree with the first very much, agree with the first more than the second, are in the middle, agree with the second more than the first, or agree with the second very much.

- If people don’t like a government decision, the most effective thing among many that people can do to change the decision is 1) vote for another party in the next election or 2) protest and pressure government through means other than the vote.

**Substantive Democracy**

Now I’m going to read a sentence about democracy and I would like you to tell me if you agree very much or somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree very much:

- A country with big differences between the rich and poor can’t be considered a democracy.
- In a real democracy, there would be neither hunger nor poverty.
- Democracy and capitalism go together.
- In addition to equality before the law, democracy is also greater economic equality among persons.

**NOTES**

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David Crow

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15. Ibid., 185.


23. For an excellent rejoinder to Canache, Mondak, and Seligson, see Christopher J. Anderson, “Good Questions, Dubious Inferences, and Bad Solutions: Some Further Thoughts on Satisfaction with Democracy,”
The model is quasi-symmetrical, with a specific parameter for the \{1,4\} cell, and posits a concentration of values on the main diagonal that weakens farther away from it. Model fit is good, with a BIC of −22.26, on five degrees of freedom.

25. I also estimated the models with just the satisfaction item as the dependent variable, and the results are substantively the same.


33. Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), for one, has argued that the supermajority requirements frequently established to protect minority rights are undemocratic because they violate the principle of majority rule.

34. Francisco I. Madero, *La Sucesión Presidencial en 1910* (Mexico City: Secretaria de Gobernación, 1999 [1908]).

35. Where there were two- or three-way ties for the highest scores I do not classify respondents into any type of democracy, omitting them from the tabulation reported in Figure 2.

36. Camp, *Citizen Views*.

37. A third theoretical current used to explain satisfaction with democracy is institutionalism, where institutions are understood as the rules and organizations that structure interaction between political actors. For example, Anderson and Guillery find that electoral systems affect satisfaction with democracy: citizens in proportional representation (PR) systems are more satisfied than in majoritarian systems because PR is better at compensating losers of elections. Although institutions are important determinants of satisfaction, I do not consider them here simply because the data do not allow me to investigate institutions’ effects. My survey covers Mexico at a single moment in time. Government structures and electoral systems are required to be homologous with those of the federal government and, therefore, present no geographical variance at the subnational level. Similarly, the cross-sectional nature of the survey precludes me from looking into institutional variance over time. Nonetheless, including institutional factors in my analysis would not fundamentally alter the results. It is difficult to see how one or another set of institutions affects individuals’ definitions of democracy.

38. See Norris, *Critical Citizens*.


42. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*.
45. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*.
47. Anderson and Guillory, “Political Institutions,” 68.
48. Conceptions of democracy are formulated as continuous scales rather than dummy variables, reflecting my belief that citizens hold these views in varying degrees rather belonging to one, and only one, category. Thus, all three conceptions appear as regressors. If they were dummy variables, one would have to be omitted as redundant.
49. I estimated an HLM to account for correlation of observations within geographical clusters (here, polling precincts). The “intra-class correlation coefficient,” a measure of variation across clusters as a proportion of all variation, is rho = .05, meaning 5 percent of variation in the dependent variable owes to variation across clusters.
52. Ibid.