Enacting Constitutionalism

The Origins of Independent Judicial Institutions in Latin America

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Modern constitutionalism, inaugurated in the eighteenth century by the American (1787–1789) and French (1789–1791) constitution-making processes, assigned to codified constitutions a very specific function—to prescribe an institutional framework that would establish guarantees against the arbitrary use of power. However, already in 1800, Napoleon’s constitution prescribed a personalistic rule that concentrated great power in his hands and formally made him emperor through its revision in 1804. When and why can we expect constitution-making processes to produce an institutional framework that formally serves constitutionalism?

To answer this question, a simple and general typology is presented that captures both the legal/political character of constitution-making processes and their dynamic nature. Unilateral constitution-making processes, where a cohesive and organized political group controls the agencies required to amend or create the constitution, are differentiated from multilateral processes, where at least two different political groups control those agencies. These two types of constitution-making processes are fruitful independent variables that have considerable advantages over other commonly used variables.

The hypothesis of this article is that multilateral constitution-making processes tend to establish institutional frameworks consistent with constitutionalism. Taking these types of constitution-making processes as independent variables, and the Latin American region as the empirical arena, the hypothesis is tested by focusing on some of the most important institutional mechanisms to prevent arbitrariness—indepe endent judicial institutions. The Latin American region makes for a good laboratory for assessing different explanations for the creation of independent judicial institutions. The countries examined share a common legal heritage, political culture, civil legal system, and presidential regime, but at the same time retain important variations in judicial institutions as well as in other political and economic conditions. Based on an original database covering eighteen countries from 1945 to 2005, the analysis shows that autonomous judicial councils, strong constitutional adjudication organs, and autonomous prosecutorial institutions are more likely to be created by multilateral constitution-making processes.
Enacting Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism can be broadly defined as “a method for organizing government that depends on, and adheres to, a set of fundamental guiding principles and laws.” Both ancient constitutionalism as systematized by Aristotle and Polybius and modern constitutionalism established institutional criteria that identify “constitutional governments” and contrast them with “extreme” or “despotic” ones. While ancient constitutionalism and modern constitutionalism have important differences, they share the aim of nonarbitrary government and the belief that the concentration of political power, either in a social class or in a governmental branch, leads to such a government. In particular, to preclude arbitrariness, institutions that block the accumulation of power, thus preventing that power from being used to multiply itself, are considered necessary. The presence of this type of institution is identified in this article as a minimal core shared by the codified constitutions that formally serve constitutionalism.

A bill of rights is arguably another fundamental element of constitutions that promotes constitutionalism. Whether rights need to be included in constitutions, and what rights ought to be included, has been a source of debate since the emergence of modern constitutionalism. In any event, institutions that block increasing returns of power as a means to prevent arbitrariness link modern and ancient constitutionalism and, since Montesquieu, have been considered necessary to securing the liberty of individuals and effectively protecting basic rights.

Judicial Institutions and Constitutionalism

Among the constitutional provisions that formally block the increasing returns of power, those that establish independent judicial institutions are paradigmatic. An independent and empowered judiciary is an essential part of the system of checks and balances, which modern constitutionalism created to effectively prevent encroachments by any branch on the others. In this article, to test the theoretical argument, the dependent variable is the enactment of provisions that establish an empowered and independent judiciary. The judicial institutions in question are constitutional adjudication systems, judicial councils, and prosecutorial organs.

Constitutional Adjudication As John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino have argued, constitutional courts are instruments of a moderate or limited government because they counteract the logic of “winner takes all” where elections are an “all or nothing game.” In addition, constitutional courts provide a way out for “political parties who agreed on the benefits of constitutional ‘rules of the game,’ but disagreed, sometimes fundamentally, on the precise content of those rules.” As Alec Stone Sweet points out, knowing that constitutional interpretation will be needed, creating an independent court with constitutional adjudication power can prevent the majority from using such interpretation to
opportunistically increase its power. The sample considered here includes constitutional adjudication systems in which judicial decisions in constitutional cases are valid for all (erga omnes) and not only for the participants in a particular case (inter partes). This is important because in most Latin American countries some form of constitutional adjudication has existed since independence, but only recently have erga omnes provisions been generally adopted. Also considered is the extent of the access to the constitutional adjudication organ.

**Judicial Councils** Judicial councils help counteract increasing returns of power by preventing the partisan filling of judicial offices and systematic partisan biases in judicial decisions. Usually this is accomplished by transferring to the judicial council some power regarding the appointment of judges and most power regarding their career incentives. However, the judicial councils’ functions vary across countries and within countries over time. In Europe councils were adopted as a means to increase judicial independence by taking away from the executive (usually the ministry of justice) the power to appoint judges and supervise their career. In some Latin American countries councils have also been delegated powers over the administration of the judiciary. Delegating such powers to judicial councils reduces the possibility of their being used by a temporary majority to manipulate the judicial system for political gain. The composition of judicial councils also varies. The mere existence of a judicial council does not necessarily imply judicial empowerment. It is necessary to compare both composition and functions of judicial councils in order to determine whether the judiciary is in control of a given institutional feature. In particular, we consider the ratio between judicial and lay members and the ways these groups are chosen, distinguishing between countries that not only created councils but also granted the majority of the seats to members of the judiciary.

**Prosecutorial Organs** The public prosecutor’s office is an important component of the justice system and plays a fundamental role in preventing the opportunistic use of the criminal system by public officials. There are significant differences in origin, organization, and procedures of the office between adversarial (common law) and inquisitorial (civil law) systems. However, in both systems, the prosecutor plays a crucial role in the three stages of resolving a criminal matter—investigating, charging, and sentencing. Before the trial, the prosecutor typically directs the investigation of a case and participates in the decision of whether there are enough elements to go to trial. Moreover, there are countries where the prosecutor has the monopoly over the investigative part of any case where the state is involved; therefore, in these cases, prosecutors become highly critical as the gatekeepers for the judiciary.

We focus on the institutional location of the public ministry—within the judiciary or the executive, or as an autonomous organ. If both judges and prosecutors belong to the judiciary, they would, in principle, be more powerful and clearly more independent of the political organs of government. However, such cases may cause concern over the lack of independence of the prosecutor relative to the judge. Also, traditionally, when
prosecutors are subordinated to the executive, this branch exerts pressure on the whole judicial system through them. Finally, the public ministry may be an autonomous organ, an institution parallel to the judiciary and subordinated neither to judges nor to the executive. Locating the prosecutorial organ outside the executive branch, not necessarily as an autonomous organ, helps counteract increasing returns of power, since the government will be less likely to influence the prosecutors with partisan considerations.

A Typology of Constitution-Making Processes

From a “designer’s perspective,” institutions should take a particular form depending on the specific aim. However, the particular design of institutions is hardly ever the result of a purely aim-oriented reasoning. Rather it is often the product of collective bargaining in constitution-making processes embedded in specific political and legal contexts.

Several authors have explained the nature of constitutional provisions by focusing on the politics of constitution making—in particular, on the political identity and the expectations of those who partake in such processes. Jon Elster discusses the biases that result when some of the individuals who will operate the resulting institutional framework take part in the constitution-making processes. It has also been argued that the choice of electoral systems is influenced by partisan calculations of how electoral rules will affect their abilities to win legislative seats, and partisan self-interest has been shown to influence the choice of rules to elect presidents. Tom Ginsburg maintains that the design of judicial review depends on the prospective power positions of constitution makers in postconstitutional government. Along the same line, Jack Knight asserts that the constitution makers’ expectations of whether their present preferences will be those of the majority, both in the legislature and the judiciary, has an important influence on whether they choose open-ended versus closed and detailed constitutional provisions.

These accounts share a general explanans—that the outcomes of constitution-making processes are, to an important extent, determined by the constitution makers’ political interests. However, their independent variables and the way they operationalize them are varied and not always straightforward. One of the aims of this article is to present a simple yet general theoretical framework that captures the political nature of constituent processes while acknowledging their legal face. This is done by distinguishing two types of constitution-making processes based on the conformation of the constituent body.

The typology is grounded in a distinction between what we call unilateral and multilateral constitution-making processes that draws on the central assumption of modern constitutionalism that the constituent power and the government (the constituted power) are different.

For modern constitutionalism, the constituent power (the people) constitutes by an act a new political society imprinting its will on a codified constitution that cannot be altered by its constituted agents (the government). The codified constitution is thus both
the expression of the popular sovereign’s will and the guarantee that the government will not usurp it. This classical conception of the people as the unified actor, author of the constitution, founder of the political order, ultimate sovereign, and source of political legitimacy plays a very important normative role in modern constitutionalism. However, when conducting empirical research on constitution-making processes, it becomes apparent that this notion can hardly be used. The unitary identity of “the people” is both descriptively inaccurate and theoretically problematic.

The distinction between multilateral and unilateral constituent power aims to be useful for empirical research while loyal to the normative ideals of constitutionalism. It does so by focusing not on the positive identification of the classical constituent power (that is, the constituent power is the people) but on the negative one (that is, the constituent power is not the government). In few words, a constitution-making process is unilateral when the constituent body is controlled by a single political group that rules over a territory and multilateral when this is not the case. In a unilateral constitution-making process the fundamental distinction between the government and the constituent power is violated.

Unilateral constituent bodies are typical of polities where power is highly concentrated and a political group has the capacity to successfully undergo a constitution-making process. Unilateral constituent bodies are neither monolithic nor completely unconstrained actors, but this does not imply that its internal divisions amount to those found between participants of multilateral constitution-making processes. To understand the difference, note that despite internal divisions, the members of a unilateral constituent body are part of a cohesive ruling group with coordinating mechanisms that enable it to make collective political decisions, in particular vis-à-vis the opposing political forces. Unilateral constitution makers may face internal factions, limited resources and/or capacities, and external political actors that can limit the range of viable constitutional alternatives. But we are interested in a particular capacity that the unilateral constituent bodies have and the multilateral lack—the capacity to create institutions that concentrate power, often enabling the legal persecution of opponents or “rule by law.”

To ascertain whether a constitution-making process is unilateral or multilateral it is necessary to determine the members of the constituent body. When the constitution-making process amends a codified constitution, the constitution itself plays an important role in such identification. In those cases we need to refer to the relevant amendment procedure since it establishes the legal identity of the constituent body that, depending on the political circumstances, may be occupied by one or several political groups (that may be unilateral or multilateral). Clearly, in the case of a constitution-making process culminating in the enactment of a new constitution, reference to the current constitutional text is neither necessary nor most of the time even possible. In amendment processes the identity of those who partake in the constituent body is legally and politically derived; thus, following Emmanuel Sieyes, we call them derived constitution-making processes while the processes that create a new constitution are referred to as original constitution-making processes.
This typology is fruitful theoretically not only for its simplicity and generality, but also because it combines legal and political elements, which is an important advantage over the political and legal variables commonly used in empirical research on codified constitutions. Unlike purely political variables that are constant across countries, such as the rules for establishing the effective number of parties in national legislatures, the basic criterion that establishes when an amendment process is unilateral or multilateral varies across countries and is determined partly by the amendment procedures established in each constitution. Hence, two countries may have the same effective number of parties, but each can have a unilateral or multilateral constituent body, depending on the rules for amending their respective constitutions—which can be more or less flexible. These variables capture the political dynamic of constitutionalism since they integrate the political profile of those constitutionally capable of amending the constitution and this can vary with the results of legislative elections.

Explaining the Enactment of Constitutionalism

The basic explanatory variable used here is the composition of the constituent body, in particular whether it is controlled by a single political group or not. Political groups are defined as cohesive and coordinated networks of individuals with a public identity and each is assumed to prefer the constitutional order that maximizes its relative power. In addition, different political groups tend to have different political and moral values. It follows that the preferred constitutional order of different political groups will tend to differ.

The causal mechanism that links multilateral constitution-making with the production of institutions that formally serve constitutionalism is the following. When the constitution-making process is multilateral, the different groups of the constituent body face a constraint over the type of institutional framework they can attempt to enact—other groups’ veto, which we call “the veto constraint.” Thus, power-concentrating institutions should be vetoed during the constitution-making process, independently of whether the groups are uncertain about the future distribution of power or know that one of them is more likely to be in a majoritarian position. In the latter case such institutions will be vetoed by the likely minority, while in the former case all groups will veto them. This veto follows from the assumption that political groups will try to maximize their relative power since power-concentrating institutions in the hands of another group are likely to severely undercut such power. The veto constraint blocks the enactment of certain types of constitutional provisions that contravene the central concern of constitutionalism, and thus we should observe important differences between multilaterally and unilaterally created constitutional provisions. In particular, multilateral constitution-making processes will tend to produce institutions that counteract increasing returns to power, such as the judicial institutions with which this claim is tested.
Let us contrast the above account with one given by the insurance model defended by authors such as Tom Ginsburg and Jodi Finkel, and implicitly by Adam Przeworski. Prima facie, the two accounts seem to be equivalent. Ginsburg’s main empirical implication is that “explicit constitutional power of and access to judicial review will be greater where political forces are diffused than where a single dominant party exists at the time of constitutional design.” However, the causal mechanisms behind the two accounts differ in ways that can lead to different observable implications. The key factor is the veto constraint constitution makers have in multilateral constitution-making processes and lack in unilateral ones. The insurance model departs from the idea that “the key factor from the drafter’s perspective is the uncertainty of the future political configuration at the time of constitutional drafting.”

The first thing to note is that the drafter’s uncertainty of future political configuration is a cognitive state and thus not directly observable. Therefore, an empirical test of this model requires inferring from certain observable states the drafter’s relevant beliefs. To derive observable implications from the insurance model one could, as Ginsburg does, identify different scenarios, one where “a single party believes that it is likely to hold on to political power...[and another where] many political forces are vying for power, [and] no power can have confidence that it is likely to win future elections.” However, it is important to note that there is not a necessary relation between the type of constitution makers and their levels of uncertainty. A ruling party can be either certain or highly uncertain of its future relative power. For this reason, the composition of the constituent body is not always a good proxy of uncertainty about the distribution of political power in the future. A systematic test of the insurance model would require a measure of uncertainty that allows for different degrees of certainty for similarly composed constituent bodies.

The insurance model raises an important question. When does uncertainty with regard to future political success matter to constitutional design? An implication of our account is that the effect of uncertainty depends on whether the constituent power is multilateral or unilateral. As argued above, when the constituent power is multilateral the veto constraint works independently of the levels of uncertainty of constitution makers. Given that establishing institutional constraints on the increasing returns of power has important costs for the ruling group, we expect unilateral constitution makers to avoid those institutions unless they believe there is an important probability that they will lose power, that is, unless they believe those institutions will bind others. Thus, beliefs about future political success are relevant in unilateral scenarios where there is the perception of a high probability of future power loss. For this subset of unilateral constitution-making processes, the logics of the insurance model and our account complement each other.

Finally, several authors have accounted for the maintenance and efficacy of judicial institutions as functions of the parties’ prospective share of power. For instance, William Landes and Robert Posner and Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen account for why judicial review has been maintained in the United States and Japan, respectively, arguing that when a ruling party expects to win elections repeatedly, the likelihood
of maintaining judicial independence is low; however, when it has a low expectation of remaining in power, it may be better off “tying the hands” of the potential winner. The dependent variables of these accounts and ours are different. More importantly, these accounts assume an already constituted institutional framework.

The distinction between the constituent and the constituted levels of analysis is very important. As previously stated, political fragmentation at the constituent level does not necessarily imply political fragmentation at the constituted level. Moreover, at the constituted level, given the logic of electoral competition and the presence of an established general framework within which political rivals interact, political fragmentation often leads to deadlock. In contrast, constitution makers often cannot rely on a viable institutional framework to regulate their future interactions, so the cost of deadlock tends to be higher for them. Furthermore, as we have argued, if the institutions to be enacted formally block the concentration of power, fragmentation in the constituent level will not lead to deadlock.

**Determinants of the Latin American Judicial Mosaic**

Latin American countries share a common legal heritage, political culture, civil legal system, and presidential regime, but at the same time retain important variations in judicial institutions. For instance, Mexico, Peru, and El Salvador have all created judicial councils, but only Peru has also created a constitutional tribunal, while both Mexico and El Salvador have transformed the Supreme Court and a chamber of it, respectively, into constitutional adjudication organs. At the same time, El Salvador allows all citizens to file suits before the constitutional organ, while Mexico and Peru provide access only to public authorities, such as a fraction of legislators or political parties.

Similar interesting differences exist in virtually every other judicial institution, from the prosecutorial organ to the appointment and tenure of supreme, lower, administrative, and constitutional judges. These differences are the product of the rather high number of constitutional changes in adjudicatory institutions in Latin America over the second half of the twentieth century (see Figure 1, upper left cell). Figure 1 also shows an interesting upward trend, and gap, in the proportion of countries with constitutional adjudication (solid line) and those that also have referral open to all citizens (dashed line) (Figure 1, upper right cell). Interestingly, a similar trend and gap exist between the proportion of countries that create judicial councils (solid line) and the proportion of countries in which judicial councils are in addition controlled by judges (dashed line) (Figure 1, lower left cell). There is also an interesting downward trend to locate the prosecutorial organ inside the executive branch (Figure 1, lower right cell).

**Dependent Variables** From 1945 to 2005, eighteen Latin American countries produced forty-three constitutions and twenty-nine amendments to adjudicatory institutions, in particular to constitutional adjudication provisions, judicial councils, and prosecutorial organs. The database includes these seventy-two constitution-making processes.
where opportunities existed to create or change adjudicatory institutions. In order to assess whether multilateral constitution-making processes tend to produce independent and powerful adjudicatory institutions, we created the ordinal dependent variable Constitutional Adjudication, which takes the value of 0 if the constitution of a country does not include provisions for constitutional adjudication with erga omnes effects, 1 if it does, and 2 if access to the constitutional court is open to all rather than to public authorities only. The ordinal dependent variable Judicial Council takes a value of 0 if a country does not have one, 1 if it does, and 2 if the council is composed by a majority of judges. Finally, a binary dependent variable takes a value of 1 for Prosecutorial Organ Outside the Executive and 0 if otherwise.

**Independent Variables** To assess the main hypothesis of this article, the independent variable, Multilateral, takes a value of 1 if the constitution-making process was of this type and 0 if such process was Unilateral. Remember that a constitution-making process is multilateral when at least two political groups partake in it. The 1991 Colombian constitutional assembly is paradigmatic in this respect since it grew out of a complex historical context as a consensual attempt to broaden democracy in order to confront violence and political corruption. The constituent assembly even included some political and social forces that were traditionally excluded from formal politics such as demobilized guerrilla groups, indigenous communities, and religious minorities. The assembly’s composition
was pluralistic, with the Democratic Alliance-April 19 Movement, a political party created by former guerilla group M19 after the peace process and the second largest political group holding 25 percent of the seats, and the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties together gaining no more than 60 percent of the seats together. Thus, no single political group dominated this exemplar multilateral constitution-making process.  

The peculiar circumstances of the 1991 Colombian Constitution actually made the broadening of mechanisms for political participation and rights, and of judicial mechanisms for their protection, an explicit goal. In our account, however, the explicit motivation for creating an institutional framework consistent with the principles of constitutionalism is not necessary. As we have argued, the veto constraint works in multilateral settings out of the self-interest of political groups that try to maximize their power. In 1989 Costa Rica created the powerful constitutional chamber Sala Cuarta through a constitutional amendment. In the debates there was not much discussion about the type of court the legislators were creating or the impact of such a court. But it was a multilateral constitution-making process where two main political groups bargaining in the legislature had incentives to create a power-diffusing institution.  

To operationalize these variables, where new constitutions were created we looked at the partisan composition of the constituent assembly. If the share of seats of the largest party in the assembly was two-thirds or more, we coded this as unilateral constituent power; and if its share was less than half, we coded it as multilateral. If the largest party in the assembly had between one-half and two-thirds of the seats, we looked at the voting rules established for the assembly to assess whether this party could make decisions by itself. Where there was no information on the share of seats in the assembly, we looked at secondary literature to determine whether a single political group controlled the constitution-making process. This was the case mainly of constitutions made under dictatorships, although some dictatorial regimes had constituent assemblies with the official party getting much more than two-thirds of the vote.  

For instance, in the Nicaraguan constitution of 1950 created under the dictatorship of Somoza, the official party got 70 percent of the seats in the constituent assembly.  

For amendments, we looked at the amending rules established in the correspondent constitution and then checked whether a single political party controlled the agencies required by those provisions at the moment of the relevant amendment. Our variables capture the dynamic nature of constitutionalism, and this can be shown in the coding of the derived constituent power. For instance, the typology captures that in 1988 Mexico underwent an important change when, for the first time since 1929, the PRI lost the two-thirds majority needed in the Chamber of Deputies to amend the constitution. This change multilateralized the derived constituent power. Before this election, the PRI was able to amend the Mexican constitution unilaterally (and actually did so more than 400 times). The converse process—unilateralization—occurred in Argentina under Juan Domingo Perón. In 1946 Perón captured the presidency with 54 percent of the vote, and his party (Partido Peronista, named after him in 1947) held two-thirds of the House and all but two seats in the Senate. This, in effect, created a unilateral constituent power, whereby “in the absence of an opposition party whose agreement was necessary to pass...
the reform, Peron imposed in 1949 a new constitution that allowed the indefinite reelection of the president and strengthened presidential power in several areas.” The resulting classification of constitution-making processes in Latin America is in Table 1.

### Table 1 Constitution-Making Processes in Latin America, 1945–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unilateral</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 1949</td>
<td>Argentina 1957*, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 1980</td>
<td>Chile 1970*, 1997*, 2005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador 1946, 1967</td>
<td>Dominican Republic 1994*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala 1956</td>
<td>El Salvador 1983, 1991*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama 1946, 1972, 1983*</td>
<td>Mexico 1994*, 1999*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1993, 1995*</td>
<td>Peru 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela 1961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes amendments to constitutions. These derived constitution-making processes include only amendments to adjudicatory institutions.

### Control Variables

Other variables, such as social fragmentation, the liberalization of the economy, and the international promotion of judicial reforms, have also been pointed to as conditions under which politicians tend to create autonomous judicial institutions. Social fragmentation along ethnic, religious, linguistic, or class lines may also create incentives for constitution makers to empower neutral arbiters to solve disputes among different groups. Some Latin American countries, for instance, have reformed their constitutions in order to recognize the rights of ethnic and other minorities and have created justice institutions in order to legally channel demands by these groups and conflicts between them. In addition, a balanced dispersal of economic power across societal groups or a reform coalition of nonstate actors that employs societal force to fracture institutional power may constitute two mechanisms that produce fragmentation in the political organs and thus incentives to empower adjudicatory institutions. Social fragmentation, proxied by the index of ethnic fractionalization, is included as a variable to account for this explanation.

Regarding economic conditions, it has been argued that commitments to protect property rights attract investment and promote economic growth and that creating independent and powerful adjudicatory institutions are good signals for enhancing the credibility of such commitments. Investment can come from national or international
sources, and thus politicians may increase judicial independence to enhance their credibility either with the domestic or the international business community. In processes of economic liberalization that open formerly state-controlled sectors and industries to foreign markets, the conditions of international trade may also constitute incentives to empower judicial institutions. Determining the direction of causality regarding economic conditions is complex, but we should observe higher levels of judicial empowerment associated with higher levels of economic activity and openness to international trade. Thus, two additional variables are included—Open Economy, to capture a country’s degree of openness to trade measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and GDP per capita.\(^{60}\)

International organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the Interamerican Development Bank (USAID), have invested millions of dollars in promoting judicial reforms worldwide.\(^{61}\) As stated by the World Bank’s Legal and Judicial Reform program, “The overall objective of the legal and judicial reform program is to contribute to the improvement of a more impartial, independent, accountable, and effective judiciary that is able to control corruption and improve governance.”\(^{62}\) There are many different factors that determine the amount and particular aim of international aid, such as regime type, level of development, and commitment to improve judicial institutions.\(^{63}\) However, other things being equal, we should be able to see higher levels of judicial empowerment correlated with higher levels of international funds devoted to this end if the explicit aim of the legal and judicial reforms is met. The variable External Funds, which is the sum in millions of dollars that USAID, the WB, and the IDB have invested with that particular aim in the region, captures the amount of funds provided by international organizations for legal and judicial reforms.\(^{64}\)

Finally, the variable Diffusion measures the proportion of countries having the correspondent adjudicatory institution(s) in a given year, to control for the explanation according to which countries adopt institutions based on the number of other countries doing the same thing. In order to avoid losing the first observations in the dataset, we do not include a variable measuring the institution(s) that existed in the year prior to the analysis. However, all the analyses are estimated with country-clustered standard errors taking into account that observations are not necessarily independent within countries.

**Empirical Analysis**

In order to assess whether independent and powerful adjudicatory institutions are created under multilateral constitution-making processes, we ran ordered probit regressions with constitutional adjudication and judicial council as dependent variables and a probit regression with prosecutorial organ outside the executive as the dependent variable. This hypothesis finds empirical support in our sample: multilateral is statistically significant and positively related to the creation of judicial councils (Table 2, second column) and prosecutorial organs outside the executive (Table 2, third column), and it is positively related and very close to a 90 percent level of significance to constitutional adjudication.
The rest of the variables are not statistically significant, except diffusion for the creation of judicial councils and the institutional location of the prosecutorial organ, which seem to be institutions created also as a part of an international wave, and open economy for the creation of judicial councils.

Table 2  Ordered Probit Estimates of Determinants of Constitutional Adjudication and Judicial Councils, and Probit Estimates of Prosecutorial Organ Outside the Executive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. Variable</th>
<th>Constitutional Adjudication</th>
<th>Judicial Council</th>
<th>P.O. Outside the Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MULTILATERAL</td>
<td>0.664 (0.449)</td>
<td>0.450** (0.235)</td>
<td>0.694* (0.425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGMENTATION</td>
<td>−0.575 (1.316)</td>
<td>−0.007 (1.087)</td>
<td>−1.124 (1.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN ECONOMY</td>
<td>0.0062 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.008* (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP PER CAPITA</td>
<td>0.00007 (0.0001)</td>
<td>0.00007 (0.0001)</td>
<td>0.0002 (0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIFFUSION</td>
<td>0.266 (1.299)</td>
<td>3.817*** (0.742)</td>
<td>2.426* (1.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loglikelihood</td>
<td>−71.65</td>
<td>−42.94</td>
<td>−34.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2$</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKelvey and Zavoina’s R$^2$</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors (cluster=country). Levels of significance are denoted as *$p \leq .10$, **$p \leq .05$, ***$p \leq .01$.

For a better interpretation of this last set of results, Table 3 shows the predicted probabilities of adopting independent and powerful adjudicatory institutions as the constitution-making process changes from unilateral to multilateral. For instance, a change from unilateral to multilateral decreases the predicted probability of not creating a judicial council in .15 (-.29, -.02) (confidence intervals in parentheses) and that of having the prosecutorial organ within the executive branch in .23 (-.47, .01). Table 3 also shows that the predicted probability of opening access to an existing system of constitutional adjudication increases 23 percentage points (-.03, .48) when the constituent power becomes multilateral.

The distinction unilateral/multilateral constituent power is not coextensive with the distinction dictatorship/democracy, which is often used as an independent variable in studies on constitution-making processes. The correlation between democracy and multilateral in our sample is 0.51. For instance, as noted above, since 1988 the Mexican derived constituent power has been multilateral. However, Mexico was not considered a democracy until the year 2000 when the PRI lost the executive. The opposite is the case in democratic Venezuela where in 1998 Hugo Chávez won the presidency but not a majority in congress. That fact convinced him to call a legally dubious but politically effective referendum where the proposal for a constituent assembly was accepted. Elections were held to elect the members of the assembly and the candidates of government parties,
grouped under the so-called Polo Patriótico, obtained almost all the seats, effectively creating a unilateral constitution-making scenario. With the domination of the constituent assembly, the government assumed absolute power, intervening in both the legislative and judicial powers.\textsuperscript{68} We have then a unilateral constitution-making process in a democracy. Notice that while not all unilateral constitution-making processes take place in dictatorships, all constitution-making processes performed by a dictatorship are unilateral.

Finally, a systematic analysis of whether international funds lead to the empowerment of adjudicatory institutions is not possible, because data on external funds is available only after 1990. Colombia and El Salvador have received more money, on average, since 1990, while Costa Rica and Mexico are in the other extreme. At the same time Mexico has made more empowerment changes since 1990, while El Salvador has only made two. Correlations between the average external funds and the sum of changes corroborate the lack of a relationship. Legal and judicial reforms pursue changes in access to justice and efficiency in its administration, as well as judicial independence, so perhaps their influence is less notorious in constitutional than in statutory or regulatory changes.\textsuperscript{69} But a systematic analysis of this issue may uncover a different pattern.

### Conclusion

Multilateral constitution-making processes tend to establish institutional frameworks consistent with constitutionalism. Using an original database of eighteen Latin American countries from 1945 to 2005, it is evident that independent and powerful judicial institutions are more likely to be created under multilateral than unilateral constitution-making processes. For instance, a change from unilateral to multilateral constitution-making process makes it eleven percentage points (-.29, -.02) more likely that a country will create a

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Adjudication</th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>.35 (.17, .56)</td>
<td>.16 (.04, .36)</td>
<td>-.19 (-.40, .03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.40 (.23, .56)</td>
<td>.36 (.20, .51)</td>
<td>-.04 (-.18, .03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes and Open</td>
<td>.25 (.11, .42)</td>
<td>.48 (.26, .69)</td>
<td>.23 (-.03, .48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>.78 (.64, .89)</td>
<td>.63 (.45, .80)</td>
<td>-.15 (-.29, -.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.19 (.07, .33)</td>
<td>.30 (.12, .48)</td>
<td>.11 (.01, .22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes and Judges in the Majority</td>
<td>.03 (.01, .06)</td>
<td>.07 (.02, .14)</td>
<td>.04 (.00, .10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutor Organ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Executive</td>
<td>.45 (.25, .68)</td>
<td>.22 (.09, .42)</td>
<td>-.23 (-.47, .01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Executive</td>
<td>.54 (.31, .75)</td>
<td>.77 (.58, .91)</td>
<td>.23 (-.01, .47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*All other variables set at their mean value. 90 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
judicial council, and four percentage points (.00, .10) more likely that a judicial council be governed by a majority of judges.

These results challenge a consensus that in Latin America constitutions are de jure in accordance with the principles of constitutionalism while de facto these principles are systematically violated. The widely held opinion that in Latin America the level of judicial independence de jure is a lot higher than it is de facto is based on an oversimplified look at legal texts; it is actually the case that Latin American constitutions have often failed to enact independent judicial institutions. True, almost all Latin American constitutions have a provision declaring the independence of the judiciary, but our results point to the necessity of studying more systematically specific de jure judicial institutions and to reconsider their relation to political reality. The systematic empirical analysis of the political origins of judicial institutions in Latin America presented here should call attention to these understudied but increasingly important institutions.

Our typology presents several advantages over other commonly used independent variables and has important explanatory power. The framework seriously considers the distinction between ordinary and constitutional laws, and it captures the interrelation between law and politics and the dynamism inherent in constitution-making processes. The effect of uncertainty in constitution-making processes depends on whether the constituent power is multilateral or unilateral. In unilateral scenarios where there is certainty or near certainty of power loss, the logics of the insurance model and our model are complementary. The typology can be used fruitfully in further research on the causes and consequences of constitutional design.

One policy implication for international donors and national actors that seek to strengthen judicial institutions and the rule of law is that investments in judicial reform will tend to have higher returns when the constituent power is multilateral, since independent and powerful institutions are more likely to be created constitutionally when this is the case. Adjudicatory institutions may be also created or reformed via regular statutes, but these institutions would tend to be more unstable, since they are susceptible to change by simple majorities.

NOTES

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Comparative Politics April 2010


4. For instance, arguably, the central concern of ancient constitutionalism was political stability and strength, while modern constitutionalism places a larger emphasis on the protection of the individual vis-à-vis the government. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).

5. Political power in oligarchies concentrated in a social class can be seen where the main political offices are in the hands of the few rich, or in democracies where they belong to the many poor. Aristotle, Politics, 1301a 31–37.

6. Hamilton et al., p. 331. Ancient constitutionalism attained this aim by mixing institutions of different constitutions. “For example, in regard to the administration of justice, in oligarchies they institute a fine for the rich if they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor for serving, while in democracies they assign pay for the poor but no fine for the rich, but a common and intermediate principle is to have both payment and fine, and therefore this is a mark of a constitutional government, since it is a mixture of elements from both oligarchy and democracy”. Aristotle, Politics, 1294a 37–1294b 3.


9. Hamilton et. al., Federalist, p. 78.


18. As the scandals on the firing of the U.S. attorneys during April 2007 show, no country is immune to this potential flaw of institutional design.


25. We discuss the operationalization of these accounts later in this section.

26. A political group is a cohesive and coordinated network of individuals with public political identity, such as a party or a military junta.


28. In contrast, the members of a multilateral constituent power lack those coordinating mechanisms. If the
constitution-making process is successful, the constitution becomes a coordination device. See Russell Hardin, *Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

29. For instance, three-quarters of Congress plus the majority of state legislatures.

30. There are few constitutions that contain the procedure for making a new constitution, but even in these cases the procedures are mostly irrelevant. Making a new constitution generally implies that the content of the previous one was in an important way flawed.


32. For instance, if the constituent power is formed by the representatives of several states, those from more populated states will prefer proportional representation in the legislative.

33. For instance, socioeconomic equality and the defense of private ownership are two values that may be prioritized differently by different groups. Note also that different groups can disagree on which institutional setting will realize a common desired aim.


36. Ibid., p. 24, emphasis added.

37. Ibid., p. 24.


39. Empirical accounts based on the insurance model need to be especially careful of not attributing in an ad hoc manner uncertainty to politicians after a successful judicial reform. For instance, Jodi Finkel has argued that the Mexican 1994 constitutional reform that empowered the judiciary was an insurance policy for the PRI to foreseeing losing power wanted to tie the hands of the future winners, “Judicial Reform” p. 87–113. However, there are reasons to be skeptical of such accounts of long-term strategic behavior, “according to some privileged witnesses of the reform process, in 1994, no one could have foreseen the PRI electoral defeat that occurred in 1997 or 2000,” Silvia Inclán, *Judicial Reform and Democratization: Mexico in the 1990s* Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University (2004), p. 84.

40. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the importance of this question and the relation between uncertainty and the type of constitution makers.

41. Elster, *Ulysses Unbound.*


43. This is also the case of the accounts based on principal-agent models.


45. Control over the judicial council has been a sensitive political issue in Latin America. In countries where the Supreme Court has administrative control of the judiciary, it has either blocked the creation of the council that would take away this control (as in Chile and Argentina), or it has fought to control a majority of seats in the council (as in Mexico). In countries where control over the judiciary’s structure has been in the hands of the elected branches of government, the creation of a council has been a mere formality since it is controlled by politicians (as in Bolivia). Still, in other countries such as Peru in 1969, the judicial council was created by the military government in order to manage the appointments of judges. See Hammergen, “Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform?” pp. 3–4.

46. The list of observations is in Table 1. We are aware of three other constitutions adopted during the time frame of this article that, unfortunately, we have not yet been able to find in their original version. These constitutions are from the Dominican Republic in 1961 and 1963 and Brazil in 1969. Of course, the number of amendments to other constitutional provisions not considered in this paper is much larger.


48. Ibid., p. 128.

49. We thank an anonymous reviewer for asking us to clarify this point.

50. No constitutional assembly included in this analysis required a threshold higher than two-thirds to make decisions. There were two cases in which the largest party in the legislature had less than 50 percent of seats,

51. Voting in constitutional assemblies is usually by majority, but there are exceptions as is the case in Uruguay where the required vote is two-thirds.


53. If no constituent assembly was created, we corroborated that the regime was classified as a dictatorship by Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Pérez-Liñán, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945–1999,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36 (2001): 37–65; and Peter Smith, *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

54. All the Latin American constitutions considered here are “rigid” in the sense that their amendment procedures require at least legislative supermajorities.


58. The variable measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group, so values close to 0 indicate homogeneity, and values closer to 1 indicate heterogeneity. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8 (2003): 155–94.


60. OPEN ECONOMY is taken from Allan Heston, Robert Summers, and Betina Aten, *Penn World Table version 6.2*, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of


63. Gretchen Helmke and Elena Mclean, “Inducing Independence: A Strategic Model of Lending and Legal Reform,” unpublished paper, 2006, argue that under some conditions local NGOs provide good information to international lenders about the credibility of the national government’s commitment to improve judicial institutions.

64. Data from USAID come from Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell Seligson, *Final Report: Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study* (USAID, Vanderbilt University, University of Pittsburgh, 2006). Data from the World Bank were constructed based on the Database of Projects and Operations in the Public Administration, Law, and Justice Sector (available at http://www.worldbank.org/ under Projects and Operations). Data from the IDB is based on Christina Biebesheimer, “Justice Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: The IDB Perspective,” in Domingo and Sieder, *Rule of Law*. Data for EXTERNAL FUNDS are available only after 1990. For this reason, we are unable to systematically explore this hypothesis.

65. When DIFFUSION is not included in the regression of Table 3, Column 1, MULTILATERAL becomes significant at the $p \leq .10$ level.

66. This is consistent with the fact that not all constitutional governments are democracies nor all democracies have been constitutional.


69. See Domingo & Sieder, *Rule of Law*.